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TESTING THE MODELS OF TAX COMPLIANCE:  
THE USE-TAX EXPERIMENT 
 




Researchers in a number of fields have explored the question of why 
people voluntarily comply with the tax laws. The resulting scholarship 
suggests that a number of factors influence that decision, but the precise 
role of, and interaction between, those factors continue to be subjects of 
debate. More research is thus needed, including field research to put the 
current theories to test in real-life settings. This Article proposes that state 
use taxes—known primarily as the taxes that are due when taxpayers 
purchase items online without paying sales taxes—provide a remarkable 
opportunity for that research. Compliance with those taxes is virtually 
nonexistent, and most discussions of that issue simply assume that 
obtaining meaningful levels of voluntary compliance will be impossible. 
Those assumptions are largely based on rudimentary applications of a 
basic deterrence model, which relies heavily on audit risk and penalties 
as motivators of compliance. The modern models of tax compliance, 
however, offer many different theories with which states could experiment 
to promote the voluntary payment of those taxes. That experimentation 
would not only help states to increase their tax collections, but would also 
help states and researchers to obtain a deeper understanding of the very 
models being applied. The lessons learned from those efforts could thus 
help to inform researchers, the federal government, and governments 
worldwide regarding how to best encourage voluntary compliance with 
tax laws more generally. This Article begins the process of obtaining those 
reciprocal benefits by summarizing the current models of tax compliance 
and by offering concrete examples of how states could use those models 
within the context of their use-tax systems. The Article concludes by 
exploring the features of state use taxes that make them especially well 
suited for these efforts.  
  
                                                 
* © 2015 Adam B. Thimmesch. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska 
College of Law. I would like to thank Richard Moberly, Eric Berger, Michael P. Haselhuhn, 
and the participants at the University of Oklahoma Junior Scholars Conference and at the 
Central States Law School Association Annual Conference for their helpful comments on 
prior drafts.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Modern compliance theories suggest that a number of factors influence an 
individual’s decision of whether to comply with the law. Traditional economic or 
deterrence theories assert that the decision to comply depends on a cost-benefit or 
expected-utility analysis. Compliance under that model largely depends on the 
existing penalties for noncompliance and a person’s perceived likelihood of that 
malfeasance being discovered. Other models rely on psychological or sociological 
factors that impact compliance, like social norms or perceptions of equity. 
Behavioral sciences question the assumption of rationality that has underscored 
much of our understanding of the deterrence model, and governments worldwide are 
evaluating how behavioral factors influence citizen behavior as well.1  
Legal scholars have applied lessons from this research to suggest a number of 
modifications to how our nation’s tax laws are structured and administered. The 
resulting scholarship addresses topics including the impacts of third-party reporting 
on tax compliance,2 the use of procedural-justice considerations in tax enforcement,3 
the impact of nontax consequences on reporting behavior, 4  and the behavioral 
factors that tax authorities can use to increase compliance.5 In all, however, the 
                                                 
1 See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing government attention to behavioral sciences in the 
United Kingdom and in the United States). 
2 Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is 
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1736 (2010) [hereinafter 
Lederman, Information Gaps]; Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third 
Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697 (2007) [hereinafter Lederman, 
Speed Bumps]. 
3  See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compliance: 
Recommendations for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 622–31 (2007) (discussing tax morale 
and procedural justice as motivators of tax compliance); Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance 
and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 996–1008 (2003) [hereinafter Lederman, Tax 
Compliance] (discussing research on how the perceived fairness of IRS procedures may 
increase tax compliance); Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1071–73 (2003) (discussing study results showing that “individuals’ 
perceptions of procedural fairness in their dealings with decision makers have a positive 
impact on compliance with legal obligations”); Leigh Osofsky, Some Realism About 
Responsive Tax Administration, 66 TAX L. REV. 121, 126–30, 140–43 (2012) (evaluating the 
procedural-justice literature and concluding that it is uncertain if procedural justice increases 
compliance). 
4 See generally Joshua D. Blank, Collateral Compliance, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 719 (2014). 
5 See, e.g., id. at 745–55 (analyzing the behavioral aspects of tax compliance); Joshua 
D. Blank, In Defense of Individual Tax Privacy, 61 EMORY L.J. 265, 287–326 (2011) 
(focusing on the “interaction between tax privacy and specific examples of tax enforcement 
. . . motivated by behavioral research”); Sarah B. Lawsky, Modeling Uncertainty in Tax Law, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 241, 257–73 (2013) (introducing a model that takes into account 
individuals’ responses to uncertainty); Susan Cleary Morse, Using Salience and Influence to 
Narrow the Tax Gap, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 483, 500–03 (2009) (evaluating behavioral 
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various models of tax compliance establish that taxpayers’ decision-making 
processes are dynamic and multifaceted. The only clear conclusion is that 
compliance is nearly universal in situations where detection and punishment are 
practically assured. These include the taxation of wage income, which is subject to 
information reporting and withholding at the source.6 
Unfortunately for tax administrators, significant amounts of income do not fall 
within current information-reporting systems, and the modern economy is shifting 
in ways that put further stress on those existing systems. From the emergence of 
virtual currencies like Bitcoin to so-called collaborative consumption services like 
Uber and Airbnb, technology is decentralizing income generation from traditional 
sources. That puts stress on the structural mechanisms that have resulted in 
widespread tax compliance in the United States.7 Our incomplete understanding of 
the motivators of tax compliance will thus be of further consequence in the future, 
and additional attention to the factors motivating tax compliance is necessary.  
This is not a matter of simple academic curiosity. The U.S. federal income tax 
gap—the difference between the amount of tax reported and the amount of tax 
owed—has been estimated to be roughly $450 billion per year.8 This is unlikely to 
improve in the near term. The IRS budget has been reduced sharply in the last several 
years, and there is no sign that those cuts will be abated.9 In the face of this resource 
shortfall, the federal government will be required to find ways to increase 
compliance that do not require costly audit activity.  
This problem is obviously not unique to the federal government; state 
governments face similar pressures. That is true with respect to state income taxes—
where the underreporting of taxable income to the IRS directly leads to the 
                                                 
compliance research and explaining how the concepts of salience and influence relate); Leigh 
Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64 TAX L. REV. 489, 499–538 
(2011) (discussing taxpayers’ potential reactions to strategic uncertainty); Kathleen DeLaney 
Thomas, Presumptive Collection: A Prospect Theory Approach to Increasing Small Business 
Tax Compliance, 67 TAX L. REV. 111, 129–39 (2013) (evaluating the behavioral impact of 
presumptive tax payments); Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, The Psychic Cost of Tax Evasion, 
56 B.C. L. REV. 617, 626–31 (2015) (discussing noneconomic theories of tax compliance).  
6 26 U.S.C. §§ 6041, 6051 (2012). 
7 See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 U. WA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=25705 
84##, archived at http://perma.cc/4BNG-PXPB (broadly discussing the tax issues, including 
the compliance issues, raised by the sharing economy).  
8 I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-4 (Jan. 6, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/ 
IRS-Releases-New-Tax-Gap-Estimates;-Compliance-Rates-Remain-Statistically-
Unchanged-From-Previous-Study, archived at http://perma.cc/C7UG-9E2T. 
9 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Ref. No. 2014-30-062, Trends in 
Compliance Activities Through Fiscal Year 2013, at 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201330078fr.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/68ZL-6G8S. 
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underreporting of taxable income to states10—and with respect to state consumption 
taxes, which do not have a federal counterpart.11 In fact, one such consumption-tax 
gap has been the subject of significant attention by states and Congress even though 
it has gone virtually unaddressed by compliance scholars—the use-tax gap.  
State use taxes are complementary to state income taxes, and are generally 
owed when a consumer makes a purchase of a taxable item without paying sales tax. 
This often occurs, for example, when a consumer purchases an item from an online 
vendor that does not collect the tax. That result stems directly from the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s determination that states lack the constitutional authority to require vendors 
to collect their consumption taxes unless the vendors have a physical presence within 
their boundaries.12 Congress could override that rule using its affirmative Commerce 
Clause power, but it has failed to do so.13 In the meantime, then, consumers are 
required to remit the required tax of their own accord.  
For reasons largely assumed and unstudied, consumer compliance with state 
use taxes is virtually nonexistent, and that collective noncompliance is costly. The 
combination of the lack of tax collection at the point of sale and consumers’ 
noncompliance with the tax is estimated to cost states approximately $20 billion per 
year.14 Notwithstanding those losses, states addressing use taxes have paid little 
                                                 
10  This is because states generally base their income taxes off of the income that 
taxpayers report to the IRS. WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 20.02 (3d ed. 2012); 
see also Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity with the Federal Tax Base, 62 DUKE 
L.J. 1267, 1274–79 (2013) (discussing the policy implications of federal-state tax-base 
conformity).  
11 See DONALD BRUCE ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SALES TAX REVENUE 
LOSSES FROM ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 2 (2009), available at 
http://cber.bus.utk.edu/ecomm/ecom0409.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4JJL-AU86 
(reporting on the significant sales and use-tax gap attributable to unremitted tax on electronic 
commerce); CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION, TAX RECOVERY AND CRIMINAL 
ENFORCEMENT, ADDRESSING THE TAX GAP, http://www.boe.ca.gov/news/tax_gap.htm, 
archived at http://perma.cc/GB67-S9UT (reporting an estimated state sales and use-tax gap 
of $2 billion); ERIC COOK ET AL., MINNESOTA SALES AND USE TAX GAP PROJECT: FINAL 
REPORT 1–5 (2002), available at http://www.revenue.state.mn.us/research_stats/research_ 
reports/2002/research_reports_content_taxgap_full_1102.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
T8PF-S3YD (comprehensively analyzing the state’s sales and use-tax gap); DENNIS COLLIER 
& JACK NORMAN, WISCONSIN’S BILLION-DOLLAR TAX GAP 3 (2010), available at 
http://wisconsinsfuture.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/TAX_GAPApril_2010.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/TNP4-L5UV (noting a state sales-tax gap of $536 million). 
12 See infra Section III.A. 
13 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (U.S. 1992) (noting that Congress 
“has the ultimate power to” overrule the physical-presence rule).  
14 BRUCE ET AL., supra note 11, at ii–iii (estimating revenue losses of $6.8 billion with 
respect to non-e-commerce remote sales like catalog sales and $11.4 billion with respect to 
e-commerce sales). Including the estimated lost revenue due to nonelectronic remote 
business-to-business commerce takes the estimated annual revenue losses to over $23 billion. 
Collecting E-Commerce Taxes | E-Fairness Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
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attention to encouraging voluntary compliance, 15  and scholars researching tax 
compliance have paid little attention to use taxes. One prominent economist and 
leading tax-compliance scholar has gone so far as to note that use taxes are “largely 
unenforceable.”16 This Article challenges that disconnect. Applying modern tax-
compliance theories to state use taxes could increase use-tax compliance while 
simultaneously providing researchers with important real-world data on those 
theories.  
To be sure, this approach goes against the prevailing assumption that states will 
be unable to produce meaningful compliance with the tax. At a base level, states 
simply lack the ability to effectively monitor and enforce their use taxes. For 
example, a consumer in a state with an 8% sales and use-tax rate who makes $2,000 
of online purchases in a year would owe a maximum of $160 of tax on those 
purchases. Allocating enforcement dollars to the tax does not appear to make 
practical sense given those relatively low liabilities.17 For these reasons, states have 
not focused on individual taxpayer compliance, but instead on getting the tax 
collected by merchants at the point of sale.18  
Unfortunately, this basic analysis and approach ignores several important 
reasons to promote individual compliance with state use taxes. As an initial matter, 
even if Congress grants states the authority to require online vendors to collect that 
tax, states will likely be able to compel the collection of only a portion of the taxes 
due on online sales. One study suggests that more than half of the tax currently owed 
would go uncollected under legislation being debated in Congress due to a de 
minimis exemption in that bill.19  Research also suggests that consumers would 
                                                 
LEGISLATURES (Nov. 14, 2014), available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-
policy/collecting-ecommerce-taxes-an-interactive-map.aspx#2, archived at http://perma.cc 
/6M8V-CAG9. 
15 See infra Section III.B. 
16 Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. OF ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 25, 37 (2007).  
17 Concomitantly, it may make little sense for consumers to expend the effort to comply 
with the tax.  
18 See infra Section III.B (discussing states’ efforts to get retailers to collect use taxes).  
19 DONALD BRUCE & WILLIAM F. FOX, AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNET SALES TAXATION 
AND THE SMALL SELLER EXEMPTION, SMALL BUS. ADMIN. 40 (2013), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs416tot.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G7SA-
64CW (“Thus, the Marketplace Fairness Act with its $1 million SSE would likely eliminate 
less than one-half of the losses associated with inability to collect tax on remote sales.”). 
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simply avoid vendors that were newly compelled to collect the tax.20 The use-tax 
gap would thus remain significant even under the most positive of assumptions.21 
States need not accept this fate, however. The situation is not as dire as this 
discussion would suggest. The prevailing attitude toward the impossibility of 
compelling voluntary compliance rests on a banal application of deterrence theory, 
but modern models of tax compliance are much more sophisticated and provide 
significant insight into efforts that states could undertake. This Article thus evaluates 
the various models of compliance and offers ways in which states and researchers 
could apply the resulting lessons to help close the use-tax gap.  
This approach is important not only for states, but for governments worldwide. 
As noted above, research on tax compliance is wide-ranging and of great 
importance, but there is significant work yet to be done. Compliance efforts with 
respect to state use taxes would thus also provide a significant opportunity for the 
U.S. federal government and governments worldwide to learn about how to induce 
voluntary compliance with their taxes, especially in contexts with diffuse third-party 
involvement and large reliance on taxpayer effort. If states can induce compliance 
with a tax that is “largely unenforceable” due in large part to those reasons, the 
lessons learned from that success should provide significant insight into how to close 
tax gaps at every level of government.  
The Article proceeds in five additional Parts. Part II introduces the variety of 
tax-compliance theories, from the classic economic or deterrence model to modern 
theories relying on research on procedural justice and behavioral economics. Part III 
provides background information on the tax gap generally and state use taxes and 
the use-tax gap in particular. It also discusses the limited empirical research that has 
been done on use-tax compliance to date. Part IV introduces a number of ways that 
states could apply the models of tax compliance to promote compliance with their 
use taxes. These include the application of well-known tax-compliance measures, as 
well as new methods based upon recent research. Part V ties the previous sections 
together by explaining why state use taxes are particularly well suited to host these 
experimental efforts, and Part VI concludes.  
 
II.  THE MODELS OF TAX COMPLIANCE 
 
The question of why people comply (or fail to comply) with their legal 
obligations has been the subject of extensive research and scholarship that spans 
                                                 
20 See Liran Einav et al., Sales Taxes and Internet Commerce, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 
24 (2014) (discussing consumer behavior on eBay); Brian Baugh et al., The “Amazon Tax”: 
Empirical Evidence from Amazon and Main Street Retailers 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 20052, 2014), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w200 
52.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CC79-56UF (discussing consumer behavior in response 
to the collection of sales tax by Amazon.com). 
21 This necessarily assumes that Congress would not grant states the ability to require 
the collection of tax by all vendors. The commercial concerns with, and opposition to, that 
approach suggest that any political solution will necessarily include a small-seller exception.  
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many academic disciplines. No one article could provide a complete overview of the 
literature on this topic. The major theories of tax compliance are, however, 
introduced in the following sections. Part II.A first discusses the classic deterrence 
model, which focuses on the pecuniary interests of taxpayers. Part II.B then 
discusses models that focus on other, nonpecuniary factors that may influence 
taxpayers’ decision-making processes, including models based on (1) social norms, 
(2) perceptions of fairness and trust in taxing authorities, and (3) behavioral biases.  
 
A.  The Economic Model of Tax Compliance 
 
1.  The Basic Deterrence Model 
 
The classic economic model presumes that individual citizens are rational, 
utility-maximizing actors. The model thus posits that one will choose to defy the law 
if the anticipated benefits from not complying exceed the expected costs of that 
action.22 That model has been applied to tax-evasion analyses since at least 1972.23 
Application of the model, however, results in estimates of compliance that are much 
lower than currently realized.24 Those low estimates are due to the relatively low 
penalty and audit rates that currently exist. Assume, for example, that a taxpayer is 
determining whether to report $10,000 of income. Assume further that the taxpayer 
would pay tax at the rate of 40% on that income, that his likelihood of being audited 
and having the evasion detected is 5%,25 and that the penalty rate if detected would 
                                                 
22 Lawsky, supra note 5, at 248–49; Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms 
and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1463–68 (2003) [hereinafter 
Lederman, Interplay Between Norms]. That formulation uses the terms “costs” and 
“benefits,” but would more appropriately refer to utility losses and utility gains. The 
economic model has long incorporated the concept of utility to recognize that each dollar is 
not of equivalent value to a taxpayer. Lawsky, supra note 5, at 254 n.43. See also Sarah B. 
Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904, 
911–12 (2011) [hereinafter Lawsky, On the Edge] (discussing various concepts of utility). 
For simplicity, this Article will largely refer to costs and benefits rather than utility losses 
and utility gains.  
23  Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical 
Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323, 323 (1972). Allingham and Sandmo exported the work of Gary 
Becker, who introduced the deterrence model to legal scholarship in the 1960s with his work 
on crime and punishment, into tax literature. See id. (citing Gary S. Becker, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968)).  
24 James Alm, Measuring, Explaining, and Controlling Tax Evasion: Lessons from 
Theory, Experiments, and Field Studies, 19 INT’L TAX AND PUB. FIN. 54, 56–60 (2012); 
Michele Bernasconi, Tax Evasion and Orders of Risk Aversion, 67 J. PUB. ECON. 123, 123–
24 (1998); Lawksy, supra note 5, at 251–52; Lederman, supra note 22, at 1466–67. 
25 In actuality, the IRS audits approximately 1% of all individual tax returns. Internal 
Revenue Service Fiscal Year 2013 Enforcement and Service Results, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/PUP/newsroom/FY%202013%20Enforcement%20and%20Service%20
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be 20% of the tax evaded.26 On these facts, the taxpayer’s anticipated benefit from 
noncompliance would be the $4,000 of tax that he would save ($10,000 x 40%) 
multiplied by his 95% chance of evading detection—or $3,800. His anticipated costs 
of noncompliance would be his potential penalty of $800 (20% of the $4,000 of 
evaded tax) multiplied by his 5% chance of being caught—or $40. Given an 
anticipated benefit of $3,800 and an anticipated cost of $40, compliance is not 
economically compelled on those facts.27 This analysis thus suggests that very low 
levels of compliance would be common. In reality, though, voluntary compliance 
with federal income taxes is high, at approximately 83%.28  
For years, scholars have explored the factors that explain this discrepancy and 
have suggested many that play a role. Those tax-compliance theories are discussed 
below, but it must first be noted that the classic economic model is actually much 
more predictive than a basic application of that model—like that shown above—
would suggest. This is largely because such an application utilizes a uniform, low 
audit rate based on the IRS’ current audit practices. That approach is inappropriate, 
though, when looking at individual compliance decisions because audit risk is not 
completely exogenous. The IRS does not determine who to audit at random, but 
takes a more targeted approach. For example, the IRS assigns a score to returns using 
its Discriminant Index Function (“DIF”).29 The DIF is “a mathematical technique 
used to score income tax returns for examination potential.”30 The DIF formulas are 
confidential,31 but taxpayers can fairly expect that certain actions will increase their 
risk of audit.  
As an initial matter, a taxpayer’s risk of audit will differ based upon the type of 
income being reported or hidden. There is a meaningful difference, for example, in 
the audit risk associated with failing to report wage income and failing to report a 
small cash payment from a friend. Employers in the United States are required to 
withhold and remit tax on the wages that they pay to employees.32 Those withheld 
                                                 
Results%20--%20WEB.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7N9K-S422 (last visited June 5, 
2015). 
26 Tax underreporting can also result in imprisonment. See 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012). 
The loss of freedom for a tax offense would also be a cost that could be incorporated into the 
basic economic model. Given the rarity of that consequence, however, it will not be taken 
into account in the basic model for purposes of this Article.  
27 In reality, audit rates are much lower than 5% and these numbers become even more 
skewed against the utility of compliance. See Lederman, supra note 22, at 1463–66 
(providing a similar simplified example and noting even further complications). 
28 Tax Gap for Tax Year 2006, IRS (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/ 
overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3NBL-UN5P [hereinafter Tax Gap 
2006]. 
29 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.1.3.2, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irm, archived at http://perma.cc/J8VF-2UYR.  
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 4.1.2.3(3).  
32 26 U.S.C. § 3402(a)(1) (2012).  
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and remitted amounts are reported to the employee and to the IRS annually on an 
IRS Form W-2.33 That information-reporting system all but ensures that employees 
report all of their wage income to the IRS. 34 The audit rate for one not reporting the 
same amount of wages as reported on their W-2 is either actually 100% or perceived 
to be 100% in an era where computers match information returns to tax returns.35  
In contrast to this system, with respect to wage income, a cash payment to a 
self-employed individual may involve no information reporting, and there will rarely 
be withholding of tax at the source.36 The failure to report that income thus brings 
                                                 
33  26 U.S.C. §§ 6041(a), 6051(a) (2012); Internal Revenue Service, Form W-2, 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fw2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J878-
UYGJ.  
34 Scholars widely recognize the impact of third-party information reporting on tax 
compliance. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven et al., Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a 
Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark, 79 ECONOMETRICA, 651, 656 (2011); Lederman, Tax 
Compliance, supra note 3, at 974; Lederman, Information Gaps, supra note 2; Susan Morse, 
Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 44 CONN. L. REV. 675, 
679 (2012); Joel Slemrod et al., Does Credit Card Information Reporting Improve Small-
Business Tax Compliance (Feb. 5, 2015) (manuscript at 1), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2515630, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
UJG8-S2HK; Joel Slemrod, supra note 16, at 44 (“Overall, when relatively disinterested third 
parties can be required to provide information, as with wages and salaries, high compliance 
rates can be achieved at fairly low cost.”); Jay A. Soled, Homage to Information Returns, 27 
VA. TAX. REV. 371, 371–72 (2007). Notably, at least one study has shown that information 
reporting has more of an impact on tax compliance than withholding at the source. See Kleven 
et al., supra, at 673–75. Those results are consistent with the results of a study on tax 
compliance in Chile, which suggest that the mere existence of a paper trail increases 
compliance, even where the government is not automatically provided a copy of that 
information. Pomeranz, infra note 52, at 5; see text accompanying notes 52–57 (discussing 
that study in further detail). 
35 Of course, the taxpayer may not undergo an actual audit, but she will receive an 
automated notice from the IRS correcting her income to that reported on the W-2. See Topic 
652 - Notice of Underreported Income – CP-2000, IRS, available at http://www.irs.gov/tax 
topics/tc652.html (last visited June 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/M26S-SULM. 
36  Information reporting is generally required with respect to wage income and 
payments of $600 or more made in the course of a trade or business. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6041, 6051 
(2012). Under these rules, payments of less than $600 and payments made in a personal 
capacity are generally not reportable unless a special provision applies. 26 U.S.C. § 6041. 
Payments made to corporations are also currently exempted from reporting. See Treas. Reg. 
§§ 1.6041-3(p)(1), 1.6049-4(c)(1)(ii)(A) (2009) (classifying corporations as recipients 
exempt from reporting under Internal Revenue Code Section 6041). Withholding is generally 
not required on payments made to nonemployees unless backup withholding is required or 
the payment is made to a foreign recipient. See 26 U.S.C. § 3406 (requiring withholding on 
“reportable payments” in specified situations, included when the recipient fails to furnish her 
taxpayer identification number as required by law); 26 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1442 (requiring 
withholding on certain payments made to nonresident alien individuals and foreign 
corporations).  
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with it less audit risk than that experienced by our wage earner. Applying the 
traditional model, we would thus expect compliance to be much lower for people 
with income that is not independently reported to the IRS. 
Current rates of compliance are consistent with this analysis. The IRS estimates 
that compliance with taxes for which there is “substantial information reporting and 
withholding” is roughly 99%. 37  On the other hand, where there is little or no 
information or withholding, the IRS estimates that only 44% of that income is 
voluntarily disclosed.38 The drastic difference in compliance rates suggests that the 
classic economic model is more predictive than suggested when looking at aggregate 
numbers. The high level of wage reporting simply skews the numbers in such a way 
that an aggregate approach does not provide significant information about 
compliance.39 
An aggregate approach to evaluating the economic model also fails to take into 
account other audit-risk factors, like the extent of a taxpayer’s noncompliance.40 It 
is fair to assume, for example, that a healthy business failing to report a single, low-
value cash payment would not expect the same audit risk as if it failed to report 90% 
of its income. Similarly, a taxpayer who reports a significant change in taxable 
income may also expect more scrutiny. These factors thus suggest that applications 
of the deterrence model should incorporate conditional audit probabilities that are 
based on taxpayer-centric concepts.41 Recognizing disparate audit probabilities may 
very well help to further close the gap between predicted and observed compliance 
under the traditional model.42 
The efficacy of the economic model has been shown in at least one field 
experiment specifically involving a state taxing authority in the United States. That 
study was conducted in Minnesota and tested the economic model by attempting to 
impact taxpayers’ perceptions of audit risk.43 Subjects in the study received a letter 
from the Minnesota Department of Revenue that informed them of four principal 
                                                 
37 Theodore Black et al., Federal Tax Compliance Research: Tax Year 2006 Tax Gap 
Estimation 3 (2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06rastg12workppr.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/TU42-DQJY; see also Kleven et al., supra note 34, at 653 (reporting that the 
“tax evasion rate for third-party reported income [in Denmark] is close to zero.”).  
38 Black et al., supra note 37, at 3. 
39 Lederman, Tax Compliance, supra note 3, at 974–76; James Andreoni et al., Tax 
Compliance, 36 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 818, 821–22 (1998).  
40 Andreoni et al., supra note 39, at 821–22; Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The 
Anatomy of Tax Evasion, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 18–20, 22–23 (1989); Shiomo Yitzhaki, On 
the Excess Burden of Tax Evasion, 15 PUB. FIN. Q. 123, 127 (1987). 
41  See Terrence Chorvat, Trust and Taxation, in EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY & JOEL 
SLEMROD, BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 210–11 (2006).  
42 It is unlikely, however, that it completely closes that gap. Chorvat, supra note 41, at 
210–11. It is also possible that endogenous audit probabilities based upon the levels of tax 
evaded might cause more noncompliance. Id. at 211.  
43  Joel Slemrod et al., Taxpayer Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: 
Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 455, 455–56 (2001). 
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items: (1) that they had been selected to be a part of a study that would increase the 
number of taxpayers that would be audited;44 (2) that their state and federal returns 
would be “closely examined” by the state;45 (3) that they would be contacted about 
any discrepancies; 46  and (4) that their returns might be reviewed if any 
“irregularities” were found.47 The researchers found some meaningful results. 
First, with respect to low- and middle-income groups, the government 
communications had a “very large impact” on the reporting of taxpayers with a high 
opportunity to evade—the middle-income group reported an increase in tax of 
12.1% and the low-income group reported an increase in tax of 145.3%, though the 
latter result was not statistically significant at the 10% level.48 The researchers also 
found a positive impact on the compliance of low- and middle-income taxpayers 
who had a low opportunity to evade, but that impact was not statistically 
significant.49 The researchers noted one other interesting result. Among the high-
income taxpayers, the experiment actually resulted in lower levels of compliance.50 
This was true for those taxpayers in both the low- and high-opportunity groups.51 
The combination of these results suggests (1) that efforts to increase taxpayer 
perception of audit risk can be beneficial and (2) that caution must be taken with 
respect to high-income taxpayers.  
A similar experiment was recently conducted with respect to the Chilean value 
added tax (VAT).52 In that experiment, the Chilean taxing authority also sent letters 
                                                 
44 Id. at 462–63.  
45 Id. at 463. 
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
48 Slemrod et al., supra note 43, at 465. A taxpayer was classified as having a high 
opportunity to evade taxes if the taxpayer filed a Schedule C or E (for business and farm 
income, respectively) and paid Minnesota estimated taxes. Id. at 461. All other taxpayers 
were classified as having a low opportunity to evade. Id. at 462.  
49 Id. at 465.  
50 Id. at 476.  
51 Id. at 476–77. The researchers posited two possible explanations for this result. First, 
the communication from the state may have caused high-income taxpayers to seek guidance 
from professional tax advisors, who may have determined legitimate tax-reduction methods. 
Id. at 477. The possibility of this explanation was uncertain because, although there was no 
significant change in those taxpayers who actually used tax-return preparers, the identity of, 
aggressiveness of, or directions given to those preparers was unknown. Second, it is possible 
that those taxpayers expected an audit and would have rather entered the audit with a lower 
“opening bid.” Id.  
52 Dina Pomeranz, No Taxation Without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement 
in the Value Added Tax 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19199, 2013), 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/pomeranz_no_taxation_without_informati
on_c2f18227-578f-4259-b75b-f62f2e113217.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5TCU-25ME. 
A value added tax, or VAT, is a form of consumption tax that is collected throughout the 
stages of production rather than at the end point of sale. See generally Seth E. Terkper, 
WG&L VAT HANDBOOK ¶ 1.01–1.02 (2011).  
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aimed at increasing the recipients’ perceptions of audit probability.53 However, the 
study was unique in that it was not seeking to understand the impact of the letters 
alone. Rather, the researchers were seeking to understand how such letters interacted 
with the presence of a paper trail regarding the taxed transactions.54  
The data from that study showed that there was a positive impact on compliance 
from the deterrence letter—at least in the short term.55 They also showed that the 
deterrence letters had an insignificant impact on reported figures for which a paper 
trail was available, but that compliance did increase significantly with respect to 
amounts for which a paper trail did not exist. 56  The author of the study thus 
concluded that paper trails have a “preventive deterrence effect” that leads to greater 
voluntary compliance absent government intervention.57 The study provides further 
support for the efficacy of the deterrence model.  
It is also worth noting two alternative consequences that may result from 
increased audit activity or the threat thereof. First, there may be an “indirect audit 
effect” that causes increased compliance by those who simply become aware of 
others being audited.58 This would suggest that audits have a greater economic effect 
than the funds directly collected from those audits. On the other hand, however, 
increased enforcement may have a “crowding out” effect that could actually result 
in lower levels of compliance.59 Increased enforcement actions may serve as a signal 
to taxpayers that others are not complying and, therefore, that there may not be a 
social norm of compliance.60  This could cause individuals to reduce their own 
compliance. This theory is not without critique, but tax administrators should be 
cognizant of this possibility.61 
The import of this discussion is to suggest that the economic model can explain 
the high rates of voluntary compliance in the United States much more than 
seemingly presumed by some current scholarship. When taking into account 
individualized audit risk, the traditional model can be much more predictive than 
assumed when using aggregate audit rates. This does not mean that the other models 
of tax compliance are irrelevant. It only means that researchers should not discount 
                                                 
53 Pomeranz, supra note 52, at 9. 
54 For purposes of the study and this discussion, the term “paper trail” refers to the 
bilateral filing obligations imposed on companies reporting intermediate transactions under 
a VAT. In those situations, a seller is obligated to report its sale and the buyer will report its 
purchase in order to get credit for its input cost. There is thus a paper trail, of sorts, for each 
party. Id. at 9–10.  
55 Id. at 18.  
56 Id. at 19.  
57 Id. at 21.  
58 Alm, supra note 24, at 3–4; Lederman, supra note 22, at 1494–95 (2003); Morse, 
supra note 34, at 711 n.145.  
59 Lederman, supra note 22, at 1461–62, 1495–96. 
60 Id. at 1495–96.  
61 See id. at 1497–99.  
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the value of the economic model and the powerful impact of withholding and 
information reporting.62  
 
B.  Nonpecuniary Models of Tax Compliance 
 
The disconnect between the levels of compliance that the traditional model 
predicts and those that are actually experienced has caused scholars to seek 
alternative rationales for explaining taxpayer compliance. The literature in the area 
is vast and complex, and the following materials provide a basic introduction to 
several alternative models. 63  Very loosely, these all rely on psychological or 
sociological factors that look beyond a pure deterrence approach. The models seek 
to introduce noneconomic factors that play into taxpayers’ decision-making 
processes, including factors like (1) social norms, (2) citizens’ views toward the 
legitimacy or fairness of government, and (3) a variety of behavioral influences that 
cause seemingly “irrational” choices under the classic model.64 Each of these factors 
is discussed below.  
 
1.  Social Norms and Compliance 
 
One significant nonpecuniary model of tax compliance suggests a social-norm 
rationale for tax-compliance decisions.65 That model is “complex,”66 but suggests 
that a taxpayer will comply with tax laws as long as she believes that compliance is 
the norm, at least within a group with whom she identifies.67 Conversely, she will 
                                                 
62 While the economic model may explain compliance under the conditions discussed 
herein, research suggests that compliance is still higher than would be predicted under the 
classic model for types of income that are not subject to information reporting or withholding 
at the source. See Erzo F. P. Luttmer & Monica Singhal, Tax Morale, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 149, 
152–53 (2014).  
63 The literature in this area is voluminous, and even rudimentary discussions take the 
form of a book. See, e.g., KEN DEVOS, FACTORS INFLUENCING TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 
BEHAVIOR 228–30 (Springer 2014); ERICH KIRCHLER, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX 
BEHAVIOUR 64–70 (Cambridge University Press 2007); MICHAEL PICKHARDT & ALOYS 
PRINZE, TAX EVASION AND THE SHADOW ECONOMY 6–8 (2012); WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: 
TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 2 (Joel Slemrod ed., University of Michigan Press 
1992).  
64 Broadly, these nonpecuniary factors can be swept into the concept of “tax morale.” 
See Luttmer & Singhal, supra note 62, at 151.  
65 See, e.g., James Alm et al., Changing the Social Norm of Tax Compliance by Voting, 
52 KYKLOS 141, 142 (1999); Steven E. Kaplan & Philip M. J. Reckers, A Study of Tax 
Evasion Judgments, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 97, 97–98 (1985); Erich Kirchler et al., Enforced Versus 
Voluntary Tax Compliance: The “Slippery Slope” Framework, 29 J. ECON. PSYCH. 210, 217–
18 (2008); KIRCHLER, supra note 63, at 64–70; Lederman, supra note 22, at 1459 n.29. 
66 Kirchler et al., supra note 65, at 218. 
67 See, e.g., DEVOS, supra note 63, at 230 (“The impact of social norms is relevant, as 
the majority who believe that others are compliant are compliant themselves.”); KIRCHLER, 
1096 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
 
not comply if she feels that most people in her reference group do not do so.68 This 
social-norm framework can be viewed as consistent with the basic economic model 
if we assume a utility loss when a taxpayer acts as a deviant by failing to fully report 
his or her income.69 Feelings of guilt or shame act as a cost of noncompliance under 
that construct. This is consistent with survey responses in which many taxpayers 
report that they would feel embarrassed if others were informed that they did not 
report all of their income.70 This may suggest that taxpayers simply do not want to 
be identified as a tax cheat, rather than being afraid of the resulting monetary 
penalty.  
The social-norm model of tax compliance suggests that taxing authorities must 
be especially aware of how they communicate with taxpayers. Communications that 
focus on tax evasion or the extent of the tax gap can actually have a negative impact 
on tax compliance by signaling a low norm of compliance. 71  In contrast, 
communications that highlight compliant behavior by others could have a positive 
impact on compliance.72 Recent field experiments provide conflicting results on the 
impact of such social-norm messages. For example, government communications 
that incorporated social-norm messages did result in increased compliance in two 
recent experiments conducted in the United Kingdom. 73  Notably, those studies 
                                                 
supra note 63, at 64–70; Michael Wenzel, The Social Side of Sanctions: Personal and Social 
Norms as Moderators of Deterrence, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 547, 547 (2004) (studying the 
impact of personal and social norms on the effects of deterrence on tax evasion). Under this 
formulation, social norms refer to a view about whether others are complying. Id. at 550. 
Related research looks toward a person’s internal motivation to comply with the tax laws or 
their personal beliefs regarding compliance, which may be impacted by their beliefs 
regarding a social norm of tax compliance. See DEVOS, supra note 63, at 6, 28–30; 
Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 612–17 (discussing the internalization of social norms as internal 
norms). 
68 KIRCHLER, supra note 63, at 64–70; Alm et al., supra note 65, at 142; Kornhauser, 
supra note 3, at 612–17; Michael Wenzel, Misperceptions of Social Norms About Tax 
Compliance: From Theory to Intervention, 26 J. OF ECON. PSYCHOL. 862, 863–64, 881 
(2005); cf. Tom Beers et al., Factors Influencing Voluntary Compliance by Small Businesses: 
Preliminary Survey Results, 2012 TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERVICE, 1, 21, 
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-Annual-Report/downloads/Research-Studies-
Factors-Influencing-Voluntary-Compliance-by-Small-Businesses-Preliminary-Survey-
Results.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/R39Q-U8DH (reporting data showing that highly 
compliant taxpayers were less likely than their low compliance peers to report that their 
competitors were complying with their tax obligations).  
69 Alm et al., supra note 65, at 149–50; Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves, supra note 16, at 
40 n.3. 
70 Beers et al., supra note 68, at 22. 
71 Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms, supra note 22, at 1486–87.  
72 KIRCHLER, supra note 63, at 70.  
73 Michael Hallsworth et al., The Behavioralist as Tax Collector: Using Natural Field 
Experiments to Enhance Tax Compliance 17–19, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
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focused on the payments of taxes that the taxpayers had already declared as due.74 
A prior study conducted in Minnesota tested the impact of social-norm messages in 
the context of taxpayers’ initial tax filings, but did not find any statistically 
significant evidence of a benefit from those messages.75 That study thus provides an 
interesting counterpoint to the U.K. study,76 and further research is warranted. In the 
end, though, regardless of whether normative appeals can increase compliance, it 
appears as though the existence of a compliance norm, in and of itself, does impact 
compliance.77  
 
2.  Fairness, Trust, and Tax Compliance 
 
Taxpayers’ compliance decisions may also depend on their perceptions of the 
fairness of the tax system.78 In the compliance literature, the concept of “fairness” is 
often broken down into three distinct categories—distributive justice, procedural 
justice, and retributive justice.79 In the tax context, distributive justice refers to the 
fairness of the allocation of the tax burden across the population. We can view 
distributive fairness from the perspective of horizontal equity (i.e., whether the tax 
burden is distributed fairly among like individuals), vertical equity (i.e., whether the 
tax burden is distributed appropriately among people with different levels of 
                                                 
Paper No. 20007, 2014), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w20007, archived at 
http://perma.cc/YU5V-35HC. 
74 Id. at 4–5.  
75 Marsha Blumenthal, Charles Christian & Joel Slemrod, Do Normative Appeals Affect 
Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 
125, 126 (2001).  
76 An analysis of the study by a member of the Minnesota Department of Revenue was 
more positive regarding the outcome of the study. That analysis concluded that the use of 
descriptive norm statements provided the “most cost-effective potential for increasing 
voluntary compliance.” Stephen Coleman, Income Tax Compliance: A Unique Experiment 
in Minnesota, 13(2) GOV’T FIN. REV. 11, 14 (1997).  
77 KIRCHLER, supra note 63, at 66; see DIANA ONU & LYNNE OATS, SOCIAL NORMS AND 
TAX COMPLIANCE 5, Paper No. 006-14, 2014, http://tarc.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityof 
exeter/businessschool/documents/centres/tarc/publications/discussionpapers/Social_norms_
and_tax_compliance_May_14.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2LPG-BTH9.  
78  Some research suggests that fairness determinations may be among the most 
important in predicting taxpayer compliance. Eva Hofmann et al., Preconditions of Voluntary 
Tax Compliance: Knowledge and Evaluation of Taxation, Norms, Fairness, and Motivation 
to Cooperate, 216 J. OF PSYCHOL. 209, 212 (2008). It seems safe to suggest that this position 
holds true only outside of areas where compliance is essentially compelled through 
withholding and information reporting. The fairness model should be viewed as predicting 
behavior among the groups with realistic opportunities to evade.  
79 See DEVOS, supra note 63, at 6–7; Hofmann et al., supra note 78, at 212; Michael 
Wenzel, Tax Compliance and the Psychology of Justice: Mapping the Field, in TAXING 
DEMOCRACY 41, 45–46 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2002).  
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income), and exchange equity (i.e., whether the tax burden is distributed 
appropriately based upon the benefits that individuals receive from government).80  
The concept of distributive justice must be taken into account in any 
comprehensive review of the motivators of tax compliance. This Article, however, 
will not focus on how to test compliance theories by modifying the actual 
distribution of tax burdens or the provision of government services. Those matters 
involve fundamental questions of governance, and modifying current practices to 
achieve greater use-tax compliance is too much to ask from an experimental 
standpoint. It is fair to think, though, about how taxing authorities could change 
taxpayers’ perceptions regarding these matters. For example, behavioral research 
suggests that taxpayer preferences on the distribution of the tax burden could vary 
based simply on how the information is presented.81 Additionally, governments 
could change taxpayers’ perceptions of exchange equity simply by making 
government services more salient to taxpayers without actually changing how, or to 
whom, those services are provided. 
Our other two forms of fairness—procedural and retributive justice—can be 
discussed in the context of research showing that compliance with the laws is 
impacted by individuals’ views on the legitimacy of government’s authority.82 That 
research suggests that people who view an authority as legitimate are generally more 
likely to comply with the commands of that authority regardless of their personal 
feelings regarding the desirability of the commanded act.83 It also suggests that the 
legitimacy of government is determined, in part, by citizens’ perceptions of the 
trustworthiness of government and by their perceptions of the fairness of the 
                                                 
80 Hofmann et al., supra note 78, at 212.  
81 See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL., PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 106, 113–15 (2006) (showing that individuals’ perceptions of tax matters are 
impacted by factors such as whether the information is presented in absolute or percentage 
terms and whether tax provisions are structured as bonuses or penalties).  
82 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 25–27 (2006) [hereinafter TYLER, WHY 
PEOPLE OBEY]; Levi et al., Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimating Beliefs, 53 
AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 354, 354–56 (2009) [hereinafter Levi et al., Conceptualizing 
Legitimacy]. See generally Margaret Levi et al., The Reasons for Compliance with Law, in 
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 70–99 (Oxford University 
Press 2012) [hereinafter Levi et al., Reasons for Compliance] (describing research results that 
support the claim that individuals’ views regarding the legitimacy of government authority 
impact voluntary compliance rates). The concept of “procedural justice” is broad, but can be 
defined as, “the fairness of different ways of resolving conflicts or making allocations.” 
TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 11–12 (1997). The concept of 
“retributive justice” refers to considerations of “how people react to the breaking of social 
rules” and the “attribution of responsibility for and responses to the breaking of social rules.” 
Id. at 12.  
83 TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 82, at 57–62; Levi et al., Conceptualizing 
Legitimacy, supra note 82, at 354. 
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processes used by government.84 Though these two concepts are related, they are 
distinct. 85  Citizens’ perceptions regarding the trustworthiness of government 
depend, in part, on their judgments regarding the motivations, competence, and 
performance of government officials.86 Citizens’ perceptions regarding procedural 
justice, on the other hand, more specifically depend on the fairness of the processes 
that the government uses in its interactions with citizens.87  
Research suggests that trust in government indeed has a positive impact on 
voluntary compliance88 and that the way in which the government exercises its 
power can impact citizens’ trust determinations.89 It also suggests that administrative 
competence may be a significant factor in citizens’ perceptions of the 
trustworthiness of government and that competency judgments include evaluations 
of whether the government will enforce the laws against those who do not comply.90 
That is because “coercion is important for reassuring citizens that others will be 
punished. It signals government competence and protects citizens from being a 
sucker while others free ride.”91 In one study, citizen perception that the government 
was competent and honest translated into a fifteen-percentage-point increase in the 
probability that a taxpayer would accept the tax administrator’s authority.92  
                                                 
84  Levi et al., Conceptualizing Legitimacy, supra note 82, at 356. This research 
differentiates between “value-based legitimacy” and “behavioral legitimacy.” The former 
refers to individuals’ internal sense that they should obey a government mandate. The latter 
refers to whether they actually do so. Id. at 356. The research of Levi, Tyler, and Sacks 
suggests that value-based legitimacy enhances behavioral legitimacy. Levi et al., Reasons for 
Compliance, supra note 82, at 82–84. That is, when people feel an obligation to comply with 
the law, they generally do so.  
85 Id. at 72. 
86 Id. 
87 TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 82, at 175. 
88 KIRCHLER, supra note 63, at 202–06; Beers et al., supra note 68, at 4; Katharina Gangl 
et al., “How can I help you?” Perceived Services Orientation of Tax Authorities and Tax 
Compliance, 69 PUB. FIN. ANALYSIS 487, 501–04 (2013). 
89 Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Deterrence and Tax Morale: How Tax Administrations 
and Taxpayers Interact, 3 OECD PAPERS 1, 15 (2003); Gangl et al., supra note 88, at 500–
04; Kirchler et al., supra note 65, at 213. 
90 Levi et al., Reasons for Compliance, supra note 82, at 73; Margaret Levi & Audrey 
Sacks, Legitimating Beliefs: Sources and Indicators 12, 15–16 (Afrobarometer, Working 
Paper No. 74, 2007), available at http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 
Working%20paper/AfropaperNo74.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QA2H-AQZY. In this 
way, enforcement impacts both taxpayers’ views of retributive and procedural justice. This 
is very important in our discussion of use-tax compliance since enforcement of those taxes is 
virtually nonexistent.  
91 Levi et al., Reasons for Compliance, supra note 82, at 73.  
92 Id. at 79–80, 80 n.7 (reporting results from survey data from a number of Sub-Saharan 
African countries). That result is consistent with the results of research on the role and 
importance of retributive justice in society. See TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A 
DIVERSE SOCIETY 103–32 (1997) (discussing research on retributive justice). Although the 
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Significant research also establishes that citizens’ beliefs regarding the 
legitimacy of government are tied to concepts of procedural justice. 93  The 
procedural-justice literature establishes that citizens care about decision-making 
processes and think about “representation, neutrality, bias, honesty, quality of 
decision, and consistency.”94 They “value being treated politely and having respect 
shown for their rights.”95 As a result, individuals may be motivated to comply based 
more on the fairness of their prior interactions with an authority than on the actual 
outcomes of those interactions. 
This work has been extended specifically to tax compliance with generally 
positive results. In one study, a citizen’s belief that the government operated in a 
procedurally just manner corresponded to an increase of 14.33 percentage points in 
the probability that the taxpayer would defer to the authority of the tax 
administrator.96 A study performed in Australia also showed positive impacts on 
compliance when fairness concepts were incorporated into reminder letters that were 
sent to taxpayers.97 Other studies on the interplay between procedural justice and tax 
compliance show similar results.98 
In the tax context, a procedural-justice framework would suggest that a 
taxpayer undergoing an audit will base her opinion of the revenue authority on how 
well she is treated in the audit rather than on the results of that audit.99 Therefore, 
the tone and method of the taxing authority’s communications100 and its respect for 
taxpayers should also matter. 101  The procedural-justice framework would also 
suggest that taxpayers should not be penalized harshly for violations that were not 
purposeful, involved de minimis amounts, involved unclear law, or were previously 
                                                 
reasons for why individuals care about retributive justice are uncertain, individuals do 
generally care that those who do not comply with social norms are sanctioned. Id.; see 
KIRCHLER, supra note 63, at 87–90. Those sanctions can be monetary or social, but justice 
requires some signal that the noncompliant behavior was deviant.  
93 Levi, Conceptualizing Legitimacy, supra note 82, at 359–60; TYLER, supra note 82, 
at 170–73. 
94 TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 82, at 175. 
95 Id.  
96 Levi et al., Reasons for Compliance, supra note 82, at 80.  
97 Michael Wenzel, A Letter from the Tax Office: Compliance Effects of Informational 
and Interpersonal Justice, 19 SOC. JUST. RES. 345, 358 (2006).  
98 See, e.g., Beers et al., supra note 68, at 15 (reporting that principles of procedural 
justice appear to impact taxpayer behavior); Hartner et al., Procedural Fairness and Tax 
Compliance, 38 ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 137, 149–50 (2008) (reporting a “clear direct 
effect of procedural justice on motivational postures” in all sampled groups); Kristina 
Murphy, Procedural Justice, Shame and Tax Compliance 23 (Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, 
Working Paper No. 50, 2003) (evaluating the negative impacts of enforcement actions on tax 
compliance). 
99 KIRCHLER, supra note 63, at 84–85.  
100 See Feld & Frey, supra note 89, at 2–3; Hallsworth et al., supra note 73, at 4–5; 
Wenzel, supra note 97, at 346–47.  
101 Murphy, supra note 98, at 20–23; KIRCHLER, supra note 63, at 84–85.  
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unenforced. The essence of procedural justice is “a commitment of government to 
uphold the laws fairly and to apply them equally to all.”102 Any violation of those 
fundamental concepts of fairness threatens to undermine citizens’ views of the 
legitimacy of the government’s authority.103  
One additional line of procedural-justice research may be helpful when 
discussing how to close the use-tax gap. That research suggests that allowing 
individuals a voice in the decision-making process helps to increase their 
perceptions of procedural justice.104 Importantly, the role of voice in that process can 
be instrumental, noninstrumental, or both.105 That is, people may value having a 
voice because it makes them feel as though they can influence the outcome, or they 
may value having a voice because having a voice is valuable in and of itself.106 The 
noninstrumental role has been shown through experimentation to produce a result 
                                                 
102 Levi et al., Reasons for Compliance, supra note 82, at 74.  
103 Research from Australia also suggests that how one deals with shame can play a role 
in compliance decisions and that how a person deals with shame can be impacted by 
punishment that is considered to be procedurally unjust. Murphy, supra note 98, at 1–6; see 
also KIRCHLER, supra note 63, at 63–64 (2007) (discussing the role of shame in tax 
compliance). Using survey data from individuals who had previously been accused of tax 
noncompliance, researchers analyzed how procedural-justice considerations impacted how 
individuals dealt with their feelings of shame and how those feelings impacted future 
compliance. The study found that those individuals were “significantly more likely to 
displace their shame, and were significantly less likely to acknowledge their shame, than 
taxpayers from the general population.” Murphy, supra note 98, at 20. It also found that 
individuals who had perceived their earlier treatment by the tax authority as unfair were more 
likely to displace their shame. Id. at 21. (The author of the study recognizes that individuals 
who displace their shame may simply be more likely to perceive government procedures as 
unfair, but calls for further research in the area. Id. at 25.) This research merely serves as a 
call for more attention to be paid to the role of emotions in the procedural-justice scholarship. 
However, it does lend credence to a compliance model that considers how tax authorities 
treat taxpayers. This is consistent with studies that evidence a link between procedural 
fairness and normative commitments to compliance. See Lederman, Tax Compliance, supra 
note 3, at 1,000 (discussing two studies that “suggest” a link between procedural fairness and 
beliefs about compliance with tax laws).  
104 See John Angus Hildreth et al., Revisiting the Instrumentality of Voice: Having Voice 
in the Process Makes People Think They Will Get What They Want, 27 SOC. JUST. RES. 209, 
210 (2014); Kornhauser, supra note 3, at 614; Levi et al., Conceptualizing Legitimacy, supra 
note 82, at 360. 
105 Hildreth et al., supra note 104, at 211–12; Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, The 
Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and Cooperative Behavior, 
7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 349, 351 (2003) (discussing studies showing 
instrumental and noninstrumental values). 
106 Hildreth et al., supra note 104, at 211–12. The latter effect can be attributed to a 
group-value model, under which people feel as though having a voice reflects their status as 
a valued member of the group and not a mere subject of control. Lind et al., Voice, Control, 
and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 
59 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 952–53 (1990). 
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that may seem counterintuitive—that voice can increase feelings of procedural 
justice even when a person is fully informed that her opinion will not change the 
relevant matter.107 
The concept of voice has been applied to the tax context specifically through 
research on the impact of allowing taxpayers to vote on the allocation of their tax 
payments. Research has found that tax compliance is indeed higher when the use of 
the funds is voted on and the outcome is widely supported.108 For example, in one 
recent study, participants were asked to make nonbinding allocations of their tax 
dollars and then to take a tax-return position on an item of questionable legality.109 
Those who were previously asked to suggest an allocation of a portion of their tax 
dollars showed a lessened likelihood of taking the questionable position.110 That 
impact revealed itself when taxpayers were able to allocate as little as 10% of their 
payment and dissipated after a 25% allocation.111 That study follows others that 
show that taxpayers are more highly compliant when they are asked for their 
preferences on how their tax monies will be spent or are otherwise more fully 
involved in determining budgetary policy.112  
  
                                                 
107 Lind et al., supra note 106, at 955–56. 
108 See James Alm et al., Fiscal Exchange, Collective Decision Institutions, and Tax 
Compliance, 22 J. OF ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 285, 288 (1993); Lars P. Feld & Jean-Robert 
Tyran, Tax Evasion and Voting: An Experimental Analysis, 55 KYKLOS 197, 199 (2002); Cait 
Lamberton et al., Eliciting Taxpayer Preferences Increases Tax Compliance (Harv. Bus. 
Sch., Working Paper No. 14-106, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2365751, 
archived at http://perma.cc/JPG2-E8ZP; Wahl et al., The Impact of Voting on Tax Payments, 
63 KYKLOS 144 (2010).  
109 Lamberton et al., supra note 108, at 11–13. 
110 Id. at 19–20.  
111 Id. at 21 (noting that “effects on compliance were seen when agency was provided 
over as little as 10% of tax dollars and decay after 25% agency is provided”).  
112 See Alm et al., supra note 108, at 288; Feld & Tyran, supra note 108, at 199; see 
also KIRCHLER, supra note 63, at 38–39. The positive impact on compliance seen from these 
voting procedures may be mediated by citizens’ trust in government. That is, voting may not 
lead to great feelings of procedural justice directly, but may lead to greater trust in 
government, which may then lead to greater perceptions of procedural justice. Wahl et al., 
supra note 108, at 154–56 (discussing the mediating impact of trust). Allowing citizens a 
more direct say in government expenditures could also help to address exchange equity, a 
component of distributive justice. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. Eliciting 
taxpayer preferences makes the connection between tax payments and the government 
services they fund more salient. Attention to greater citizen participation regarding the use of 
tax funds is thus merited. 
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3.  Behavioral Economics and Tax Compliance 
 
Traditional economic analyses of taxpayer behavior have relied upon the 
assumption that individuals are rational actors who seek to maximize personal 
utility. Under those assumptions, taxpayer decisions should not be affected by 
factors like the framing of choices, the labeling of payments, or where a document 
is signed. Research shows, however, that each of those factors can have an impact.113 
The field of behavioral economics attempts to identify, categorize, and explain the 
variety of behavioral influences and their impacts on human decision making. 
Significant public attention has been given to this work thanks in part to the success 
of the work of Professors Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein and their appropriation 
of the term “nudge” to describe the use of behavioral factors and choice architecture 
to impact individual behavior.114 In response to this work, the United Kingdom 
developed a so-called “nudge unit” to develop ways to “apply[] ideas from the 
behavioural sciences to public policy.” 115  The Obama administration has also 
worked to create a similar unit in the United States.116 Insights from behavioral 
economics have already been applied to inform government behavior on issues 
ranging from organ donation to retirement savings.117 Fortunately, a significant 
amount of work has also been done to apply these behavioral concepts to the field 
of tax compliance specifically. A full discussion of these concepts is well beyond 
the scope of this Article, but a few of the more prominent behavioral influences are 
relevant when thinking about use-tax compliance.  
                                                 
113 See infra notes 119–129 (discussing framing and labeling effects); Lisa L. Shu et al., 
Signing at the Beginning Makes Ethics Salient and Decreases Dishonest Self-Reports in 
Comparison to Signing at the End, 109 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 15197 (2012) 
(discussing the impact of the placement of a signature line on compliance).  
114 See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008).  
115 About Us, THE BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS TEAM, http://www.behaviouralinsights.co. 
uk/about-us, archived at http://perma.cc/3WU7-PFVJ. The U.K. unit started as a component 
of the U.K. government, but has since been restructured as a public-private partnership. Id. 
116  The Office of Science and Technology currently lists a “Social & Behavioral 
Sciences Initiative,” which “promotes collaborations among Federal agencies in order to 
embed social and behavioral research insights into a range of policy initiatives—from health 
care to education—and to test outcomes using rigorous experimentation and evaluation 
methods.” OSTP Initiatives, OFFICE OF SCI. AND TECH. POLICY, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ostp/initiatives, archived at http://perma.cc 
/PC37-2L8S. See also Richard Thaler, Public Policies, Made to Fit People, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
25, 2013, at BU6 (discussing the creation of this initiative).  
117 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 114, at 105–19, 177–84; CABINET OFFICE ET AL., 
APPLYING BEHAVIOURAL INSIGHTS TO ORGAN DONATION: PRELIMINARY RESULTS FROM A 
RANDOMISED CONTROLLED TRIAL, GOV.UK (Dec. 24, 2013), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/267100/Appl
ying_Behavioural_Insights_to_Organ_Donation.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XWQ3-
JX2V. 
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Perhaps the most significant insights from behavioral economics, as it relates 
to tax compliance, stem directly from Professors Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky’s early recognition of the impacts of framing effects on individuals’ 
decision-making processes.118 Kahneman and Tversky noted that individuals did not 
tend to evaluate decisions in the abstract, but did so from some reference point.119 
Thus, in the tax context, a tax liability of $5,000 may be viewed differently 
depending on the expectation of the taxpayer. If she expected to pay $6,000, she 
would view the payment more favorably than if she had expected to pay $4,000 or 
$0. In either case, though, she would have parted with the same funds.  
Another important aspect of framing is the relationship between a reference 
point and individuals’ risk preferences. Kahneman and Tversky found that people 
generally tend to have greater risk tolerance when facing losses than when facing 
gains.120 To illustrate, assume that a person is offered an absolute right to $500 or 
the ability to get $1,200 if a coin is flipped and lands heads up. If the coin lands tails 
up, she gets nothing. The expected return from engaging in the coin flip is thus 
$600.121 However, because the person is facing the possibility of a gain, research 
shows that she will be more likely to take the $500 rather than take a risk on the coin 
flip.122 If we reversed the situation, however, (and told the person that she would 
either lose $500 for sure, or that by flipping a coin she could lose $0 or $1,200), 
research shows that she would be more willing to take the risk and flip the coin to 
avoid the sure loss.123 Behavioral economists thus say that individuals are generally 
risk seeking with respect to losses and risk averse with respect to gains.124 
Scholars have applied this research on framing and risk tolerance to explain the 
impact of tax withholding on taxpayer behavior. Under a pure economic model, the 
receipt of a tax refund should generally be a negative occurrence for a taxpayer 
because it means that the taxpayer has essentially given the government an interest-
                                                 
118 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
119 Id. at 286–88. 
120 Id. at 284–86; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and 
the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 454 (1981) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, 
Framing].  
121 The expected return from the coin flip is the sum of a 50% chance of receiving the 
$1,200 ($600) and a 50% chance of receiving nothing ($0)—a sum equal to $600. 
122 Tversky & Kahneman, Framing, supra note 120, at 454.  
123 Id.  
124 Id. Interestingly, the impact of framing on risk aversion holds true even where the 
real change is not between losses and gains, but the situation is merely presented differently. 
Assume, for example, that a doctor suggests a course of treatment for a patient’s significant 
medical condition. The patient’s determination about whether to proceed with the course of 
treatment is influenced by whether the doctor presents the success rate or the mortality rate, 
though the underlying information and probabilities are the same. When presented with 
success rates (a gain), persons will tend to choose the less risky of two options. When 
presented with mortality rates (a loss), persons will tend to choose the riskier of the options. 
Id. at 453.  
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free loan from the time that the tax was withheld until the receipt of the refund. 
Taxpayers, however, often view tax refunds as windfalls and positive events. They 
seem to adopt the amount withheld as their frame of reference for evaluating gains 
and losses instead of their gross earnings. Scholars have suggested that the 
government could harness this framing effect by requiring “advance payments” by 
independent contractors and others for whom wage withholding is not available.125 
They opine that those taxpayers will be put into a gain framework if they seek a 
refund and thus take less risk.126 This would, in turn, increase government revenues 
as tax cheating would be reduced.127  
Many other behavioral factors and biases impact human decision-making and 
tax-compliance decisions. People respond differently to exactions labeled as taxes 
rather than as fees.128 They prefer the provision of credits to the imposition of 
penalties even when the impacts are the same.129 People discount future gains and 
losses much too significantly, and thus show an illogical preference for current 
consumption—a concept often referred to as hyperbolic discounting. 130  People 
accept many smaller taxes over one larger tax that imposes the same burden.131 
People value assets more after they own them—an effect called the endowment 
effect.132 People are more honest when they sign forms at the top of the page than at 
the bottom of the page.133 The list goes on and on.134 
The opportunities and challenges presented by behavioral economics and 
behavioral psychology are immense. Scholars are working to categorize and test the 
biases and heuristics that have been identified, and that work will undoubtedly shape 
how we view tax compliance in the future.  
                                                 
125 See Henk Elffers & Dick H. Hessing, Influencing the Prospects of Tax Evasion, 18 
J. OF ECON. PSYCH. 289, 292–93 (1997); Kathleen Delaney Thomas, Presumptive Collection: 
A Prospect Theory Approach to Increasing Small Business Tax Compliance, 67 TAX L. REV. 
111, 117 (2013); Gideon Yaniv, Tax Compliance and Advance Tax Payments: A Prospect 
Theory Analysis, 52 NAT’L. TAX. J. 753, 754–62 (1999).  
126 Elffers & Hessing, supra note 125, at 290; Yaniv, supra note 125, at 754–55.  
127 The research shows a more nuanced relationship between compliance, advance 
payments, tax receipts, and taxpayers’ perceptions of audit risk, but the framing effect is still 
of consequence. See Elffers & Hessing, supra note 125, at 290–91; Yaniv, supra note 125, at 
754–56. 
128 McCaffery & Baron, supra note 81, at 117–19. 
129 Id. at 114–15. 
130 Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public 
Finance, in MCCAFFERY & SLEMROD, supra note 41, at 12–13. 
131 Edward J. McCaffery, Behavioral Economics and the Law: Tax, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 599, 609 (Eyal Zamir & Doron 
Teichman eds., 2014); McCaffery & Baron, supra note 81, at 120–24.  
132 Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and 
Status Quo Bias, 5 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 193, 194–97 (1991). 
133 See Shu et al., supra note 113 at 15197–200. 
134 See generally McCaffery, supra note 131, at 609–10 (mentioning factors that can 
influence an individual’s perception of taxes). 
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III.  USE TAXES 
 
The prior discussion evidences that the tax-compliance puzzle is complicated. 
There are many motivators of tax compliance, but the precise contours and 
relationship between those factors require further understanding. This Article argues 
that the use-tax gap provides an excellent forum for applying the various models of 
tax compliance to assist in that quest. Before undertaking the task of identifying 
particular strategies, though, it is important to first understand the role and structure 
of use taxes, the current use-tax gap, and the research that has been done on that gap 
to date.  
To begin, the term “tax gap” refers to the gap between the tax that is owed to a 
government and the tax that is paid on time or that is ultimately remitted. The gap 
generally represents taxpayers’ failures to voluntarily comply with their tax 
obligations, though some of that failure is due to simple oversight or factors 
precluding compliance.135 It is difficult to precisely measure the tax gap because the 
government is unable to know precisely how much tax is owed. Taxpayer 
obfuscation, ignorance, and the so-called “black market” serve as significant 
obstacles to both tax compliance and tax-gap estimation. Using various techniques, 
however, the IRS calculates an estimated gross federal tax gap that is roughly $450 
billion a year.136 The vast majority of that tax gap is attributable to underreported 
tax, though some of the tax gap is also attributable to taxpayers who do not file their 
taxes or who underpay the tax that is reported as owed.137 Notwithstanding that 
noncompliance, the IRS estimates an overall voluntary compliance rate of roughly 
83%.138 
The story is much different for state use taxes. Compliance with those taxes is 
essentially nonexistent outside of business taxpayers and the payment of taxes on 
purchases where collateral enforcement mechanisms are in place (consider 
automobile purchases, which require payment of the tax before the state will license 
the vehicle). To better understand the source of this widespread noncompliance, Part 
III.A summarizes the history and structure of state use taxes and the legal and 
practical issues that have contributed to the use-tax gap. Section III.B then 
introduces the limited efforts that states have taken to address that gap at the state 
level, and section III.C discusses the existing academic research on use-tax 
                                                 
135 Estimating the tax gap is difficult given the lack of reliable information, and scholars 
have adopted a number of techniques to make their own measurements. Alm, supra note 24, 
at 60–62.  
136 Tax Gap 2006, supra note 28. The gross tax gap is the gap between the amount of 
tax that is owed and the amount of the tax that is paid timely and voluntarily. The IRS 
estimates a “net” tax gap of $385 billion per year. Id. The net tax gap is the difference between 
the amount of tax owed and the amount ultimately collected. Id.  
137 Id. at 1.  
138 Id. at 2. Noncompliance is largely attributable to underreported business income of 
self-employed individuals. See id. at 2.  
2015] TESTING THE MODELS OF TAX COMPLIANCE 1107 
 
compliance. Together, these sections comprehensively assess where we are and what 
we know about the state use tax.  
 
A.  The Use-Tax Gap 
 
States have imposed sales taxes since the 1930s.139 Those taxes are imposed on 
consumers who purchase taxable property and services and are generally collected 
by merchants at the point of sale.140 Using merchants to collect the tax, however, 
means that purchasers can avoid the tax by purchasing goods from a merchant—
perhaps a vendor in a neighboring state—who does not collect that tax. As a 
consequence, every state with a sales tax also has a compensating use tax, which is 
owed when a purchaser uses property in the state but did not pay sales tax at the 
point of sale.141 Consumers are required to voluntarily remit the required sums of 
use tax directly to the state, but very few have historically done so.142 
Of course, states have always understood that relying on consumers to 
voluntarily remit use taxes would be less effective than simply requiring out-of-state 
vendors to collect that tax on their behalf. States thus experimented with statutes 
requiring remote vendors to do just that. Those vendors were understandably 
resistant to those obligations and challenged them as violating the U.S. 
Constitution.143 The Supreme Court ultimately responded in favor of remote vendors 
by determining that states could exercise their taxing power only over vendors who 
had a physical presence within their boundaries.144 The Court last addressed and 
affirmed its physical-presence rule in 1992 in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,145 but 
that rule has gained more prominence in today’s world given the emergence and 
                                                 
139 See HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, ¶ 12.02.  
140 Id. ¶ 12.04.  
141  The use tax technically also applies anytime a purchaser pays sales tax to the 
merchant, but at a rate lower than the rate of tax in her jurisdiction of use. This is because the 
state of use will tax that use, but grant a credit against that tax for the amount of tax paid in 
the other jurisdiction. See HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, ¶ 18.08. This particular aspect of the 
use tax is problematic from a compliance perspective, but will not be addressed separately 
herein. See generally Adam B. Thimmesch, Taxing Honesty, W. VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2015) (manuscript at 5) (on file with the Utah Law Review) (discussing a number of 
additional situations in which the use tax applies to consumers). 
142 See Scott W. Gaylord & Andrew J. Haile, Constitutional Threats in the E-Commerce 
Jungle: First Amendment and Dormant Commerce Clause Limits on Amazon Laws and Use 
Tax Reporting Statutes, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2011, 2025 (2011) (noting that “use tax compliance 
has been extremely low historically”).  
143 See generally HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, ¶ 19.02 (outlining the legal challenges 
that ultimately led to the Court’s physical-presence rule). 
144 Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967) (“But 
the Court has never held that a State may impose the duty of use tax collection and payment 
upon a seller whose only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the 
U.S. mail.”).  
145 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
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importance of electronic commerce (“e-commerce”).146 Many online vendors do not 
have physical presences in the states where their customers are located, and they are 
thus freed from the burden of collecting taxes in those states. Of course, consumers 
still owe their states’ use taxes on those purchases, but compliance with that 
requirement is virtually nonexistent.  
Unfortunately, there is little formal data on use-tax compliance across the 
United States, but a study recently performed by the Research Department of the 
Minnesota House of Representatives147 provides valuable insight. That study reports 
data obtained for the tax year 2012 from the twenty-seven states that collect use tax 
on their income-tax returns.148 In that year, eighteen of those states reported that less 
than 2% of returns reported any use tax due.149 Only two states had participation 
rates above 5%—Maine and Vermont. Maine’s participation rate of 10.2% was 
significantly higher than the overall rates reported, but researchers noted that the 
state had undergone a compliance campaign in 2006 and had an earlier practice of 
assessing liabilities for taxpayers who left the use-tax line on their tax returns 
blank.150  
The average reporting rate in the sampled states was approximately 1.9%.151 
The average amount of tax reported ranged from $39 in Pennsylvania to $876 in 
Connecticut. 152  Notably, the data show that states see “significant increases in 
collections” when they place lines on their income-tax returns for taxpayers to report 
their use-tax liabilities.153 Thirteen states in the study also provided taxpayers with 
lookup tables to estimate their tax liabilities, and the participation rate in those states 
was 2.2% versus a participation rate of 1.3% in states without such tables. 154 
Interestingly, although the participation rate was higher in states with lookup tables, 
the average amount of tax reported was actually lower in those states.155 
                                                 
146  Overall, e-commerce in the United States exceeds $70 billion per quarter and 
represents approximately 6% of total retail commerce in the United States. Press Release, 
U.S. Census Bureau News, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales 3rd Quarter 2014 (Nov. 18, 
2014), http://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/ec_current.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/D354-XWP5. 
147 Nina Manzi, Minn. House of Representatives Research Dep’t, Use Tax Collection 
on Income Tax Returns in Other States 7 (April 2015), available at 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/usetax.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2VLA-
F7C7. 
148 Id. 
149 Id.  
150 Id. at 8.  
151 Id. at 10.  
152 Id. at 7. The Connecticut numbers are much higher than other states. The next highest 
average amount reported per return was $154 in California. Id. 
153 Id. at 8.  
154 Id. at 9–10. 
155 Id. at 11.  
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These data show that compliance numbers are indeed small. The numbers 
reported in the study represent data from states where the tax issue is presented to 
taxpayers directly on their income-tax return. Presumably, compliance is even lower 
in states where taxpayers must take the affirmative step of seeking out an unfamiliar 
use-tax return to report and pay their tax. We could thus presume a participation rate 
of effectively zero in those states.  
This low level of compliance is costly. The sales-tax revenue lost due to e-
commerce alone is estimated to be approximately $12 billion annually.156 Adding in 
the lost revenue from catalogue sales takes this number to nearly $20 billion 
annually.157 States would thus benefit immensely from the reversal of the physical-
presence rule by either the Supreme Court or Congress, but neither has acted to 
modify the rule. States are making progress, however, toward obtaining passage of 
a federal bill that would allow them to require remote vendors of a certain size to 
collect and remit their taxes. The most recent vehicle for that approach was the 
Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013.158 The Senate passed that bill in early 2013, but 
the House failed to take action on the legislation.159 In 2014, commentators were 
more optimistic that the House would revise the bill to appeal to more conservatives, 
                                                 
156 BRUCE ET AL., supra note 11, at ii. The study gave two estimates—one based on a 
“baseline” growth estimate and one based on an “optimistic” growth estimate. Id. The 
estimated losses were $11.4 billion and $12.65 billion, respectively. The magnitude of these 
estimated revenue losses is not without debate. See, e.g., Noah Aldonas, DOR Disputes E-
Commerce Sales Tax Loss Estimates, 65 ST. TAX NOTES 576, 576 (2012) (noting statements 
by Nebraska’s then-Tax Commissioner that the Bruce and Fox estimates of lost use-tax 
revenue from e-commerce sales were significantly overstated); Joseph Henchman, Internet 
Sales Tax Collections Falling Far Short of Experts’ Estimates, TAX FOUND.: THE TAX POL’Y 
BLOG (March 18, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/internet-sales-tax-collections-falling-
far-short-experts-estimates, archived at http://perma.cc/R7LL-KK4U (noting that the $11 
billion estimate related to e-commerce is “far off” and “probably overstated by four- or five-
fold”); Laura Mahoney et al., States See Little Revenue from Online Sales Tax Laws, Keep 
Pressure on Congress, BLOOMBERG BNA: DAILY TAX REP. (Jan. 8, 2014), available at 
http://www.bna.com/states-little-revenue-n17179881226/, archived at http://perma.cc/8PYD 
-E2PF (noting that other studies have estimated the annual losses at $3.9 billion and $3.55 
billion per year). These critiques often rely on recent experiences in states where vendors 
have started to collect use taxes to show that scholars’ estimates are overstated. It is thus fair 
to question the exact magnitude of the uncollected use tax, but it is too early to tell whether 
current estimates are incorrect. See Billy Hamilton, Fox and Friends: The Rest of the Story 
on E-Commerce Tax Loss Estimates, 68 ST. TAX NOTES 535, 535–40 (2013) (discussing 
potential reasons that states’ collections may not match academic estimates). 
157 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
158 159 CONG. REC. S3069–3085 (May 6, 2013) (citing S. 743, 113th Cong. (2013); 
H.R. 684, 113th Cong. (2013)). 
159 Henry J. Reske, U.S. House Judiciary Committee Mum on New Draft of Marketplace 
Fairness Act, 71 ST. TAX NOTES 341, 341 (2014). 
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but it took no action beyond a House Judiciary Committee hearing.160 In early 2015, 
a new version of the Marketplace Fairness Act (the “Act”) was introduced in the 
Senate.161 That version is fundamentally the same as the 2013 version, but has a 
delayed effective date.162  
A full discussion of the Act is beyond the scope of this Article, but a couple of 
key points should be noted. First, the Act would not give states blanket authority to 
require remote vendors to collect their taxes. A state’s laws must conform to a 
number of simplifying provisions before a state could obtain the benefits of the 
Act.163  States that are unwilling or unable to do so would not be afforded the 
protection of the Act. Second, the Act contains a “small seller” exception that would 
significantly limit its grant of authority.164 That exception applies to protect those 
vendors who make no more than $1,000,000 in remote sales in a year.165 Unless a 
vendor’s remote sales exceed that threshold, the Act would not grant states authority 
to impose obligations on that vendor.  
The impact of the small-seller exception should not be understated. The vast 
majority of online retailers in the United States have sales that fall below the 
$1,000,000 threshold, and the impact of that small-seller exception is that less than 
0.1% of online retailers would be required to collect tax.166 Further, although the 
sales of those “large” retailers represent approximately 57.3% of total U.S. retail 
electronic commerce,167 many of those retailers are already collecting sales tax in 
many states. As a result, researchers estimate that the Act, with the current small-
seller exception, would close less than one-half of the use-tax gap.168 That number 
does not take into account the additional revenue that may escape taxation when 
                                                 
160 Press Release, U.S. H.R. Judiciary Comm., House Judiciary Committee to Hold 
Hearing on the Internet Sales Tax Issue (Mar. 10, 2014), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2014/3/house-judiciary-committee-to-hold-hearing-
on-the-internet-sales-tax-issue, archived at http://perma.cc/98ML-SLPS; H.R. 684 (113th): 
Marketplace Fairness Act of 2013, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/ 
113/hr684, archived at http://perma.cc/8K8U-4YAZ (last visited June 5, 2015) (showing that 
the House version of the Marketplace Fairness Act was referred to committee on February 
14, 2013 and has not emerged). 
161  S. 698, 114th Cong. (2015). House Republicans have also circulated drafts of 
competing bills, but those drafts rely on origin sourcing and are heavily critiqued by those in 
the tax community. See John A. Swain, Reconciling the Marketplace Fairness Act and Origin 
Sourcing, 75 ST. TAX NOTES 809, 809 (2015); Maria Koklanaris, NCSL Blasts Goodlatte for 
Hybrid Origin-Sourcing Proposal, 75 ST. TAX NOTES 251, 251 (2015).  
162 S. 698, 114th Cong. § 3(h) (2015).  
163 Id. § 2. 
164 Id. § 2(c).  
165 Id.  
166 BRUCE & FOX, supra note 19, at 4. 
167 Id. at 4–5.  
168 Id. at 40.  
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consumers shifted their shopping to retailers that were protected by the small-seller 
exception.169  
Recognizing the revenue-limiting impact of the small-seller exception is 
critically important. Even if the Act is passed, states will need to develop a different 
approach if they want to collect the use taxes that are due.  
 
B.  Existing Efforts to Close the Use-Tax Gap at the State Level 
 
Thus far, states have largely failed to take meaningful efforts to encourage 
voluntary compliance with their use taxes.170 Many accept that inaction because 
those taxes seem unenforceable. Each individual consumer owes relatively little in 
tax, so enforcing the tax through individual audits seems unadvisable if looking at 
the direct return on investment.171 This is especially true when enforcement dollars 
are scarce. States have, however, recently taken two different approaches worthy of 
note.  
First, as discussed above, many states have included use-tax lines on their 
income-tax returns. Use tax has historically been paid on a separate use-tax return, 
which is familiar for business taxpayers who pay sales and use taxes regularly, but 
is likely completely unknown to most individuals. States realized that incorporating 
use-tax payments into the income-tax return process would increase compliance 
through salience, if nothing more. Twenty-seven states thus currently include a use-
tax line item on their individual income-tax returns.172  
Implementation of this method has taken different forms. Some states provide 
a line item on their return and nothing more, some provide tables for taxpayers to 
                                                 
169 Recent research suggests that individuals respond to the collection of use tax by 
online vendors by shifting their purchasing to vendors who do not collect that tax. E.g., Einav 
et al., supra note 20, at 2 (explaining “how [eBay] consumers shift their purchasing across 
states and between offline and online retail in response to state sales taxes”); Baugh et al., 
supra note 20, at 3 (showing “that Amazon experience[d] a dramatic decline in sales 
following the implementation of an Amazon Tax”). 
170  See Mike Maciag, Use Tax Revenues: How Much Are States Not Collecting, 
GOVERNING (May 1, 2012), http://www.governing.com/blogs/by-the-numbers/state-use-tax-
collection-revenues.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HX8X-Z2UV (“States rarely pursue 
those who skirt use tax obligations” and that “[t]argeting use tax cheats is largely 
impractical”). There are exceptions to this general apathy toward use-tax payment and 
enforcement. See Thimmesch, supra note 141, at 11–13 (discussing several situations in 
which use taxes are enforced). 
171  Manzi, supra note 147, at 4 (“States have historically viewed the use tax on 
individuals as impractical to enforce—the tax typically involves small amounts owed on a 
large number of transactions for which the individual has not kept records, and the costs of 
collection could easily exceed the revenues collected.”); Phillip W. Gillet, Jr., Privacy Issues 
May Add to the Debate Over State Taxation of E-Commerce, J. MULTISTATE TAX’N, Sept. 
2001, at 13, 16 (“One problem with use taxes is that enforcement on buyers is such a logistical 
nightmare that states rarely actively enforce their use tax provisions.”). 
172 Manzi, supra note 147, at 2. 
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use to find an average amount of tax due, and some require taxpayers to specifically 
write “zero” in the use-tax line if they are reporting no use-tax liability.173 The State 
of Michigan has gone one step further, and provides a warning to taxpayers when 
they access the state’s income-tax return online.174 The state’s webpage displays a 
warning that states if the taxpayer reports “zero” on the use-tax line, she is 
“certifying that no USE TAX is owed.”175 The warning then notes that “[i]f it is 
determined that Use Tax is owed, the taxpayer will be liable for the deficiency as 
well as interest and may be subject to penalty.”176 Despite the ragged nature of these 
approaches, they have been somewhat successful, in that they have generated some 
revenue.177 However, overall compliance rates even in those states are shockingly 
low.178 Recent data show that the percentage of returns reporting use tax in states 
where there is a line item on the income-tax return ranges from 0.2% to 10.2%.179 
Those data are skewed by states with reporting percentages significantly above the 
average. As noted above, average compliance in states without a lookup table is 
1.3% and is 2.2% in states with a lookup table.180 
The other major state effort to collect use taxes from individual taxpayers has 
been the implementation of information-reporting systems with respect to remote 
purchases. Those efforts started with Colorado in 2010 when the state adopted a 
unique statute that imposes three different obligations on retailers who sell to 
consumers in the state but who do not collect and remit the state’s sales or use taxes. 
The first is a transaction-based notice that vendors are required to provide to 
Colorado purchasers during the course of their purchase transaction.181 That notice 
informs consumers of the existence of the state use tax and their responsibility for 
paying that tax. 182  The second is an annual report that vendors must send to 
consumers to summarize their annual purchase activity from that vendor.183 The 
third is an annual statement that must be mailed to the Colorado Department of 
                                                 
173 Id. at 8–10; see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 64I, § 4A (2010) (allowing the payment 
of tax based on an “estimated liability” table except for purchases of single assets with a sales 
price of $1,000 or greater). 
174 2013 Michigan Individual Income Tax Return MI-1040, MICH. DEP’T OF TREASURY 
(Oct. 2013), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/taxes/MI-
1040_442214_7.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/UN25-SZDS.  
175 Id. The pop-up box containing these statements is initiated when the website is 
accessed. A copy of the text is included below. This approach is obviously remarkable. 
176 Id. The pop-up box containing these statements is initiated when the website is 
accessed.  
177 Manzi, supra note 147, at 7 tbl.1. 
178 Id.  
179 Id. at 13 tbl.3.  
180 Id. at 14.  
181 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5)(c)(I) (2014). 
182 Id.  
183  Id. at § 39-21-112(3.5)(d)(I)(A); COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-112-3.5(3)(a), (c) 
(2009). 
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Revenue.184 That statement informs the state of taxpayers’ total annual purchases 
from the vendor.185 This scheme has been the subject of a constitutional challenge 
since shortly after its enactment, and that litigation is currently ongoing.186 
A number of states have adopted similar, but less extensive, reporting laws.187 
Those laws are notable in that they require only a point-of-sale notification.188 They 
do not require vendors to send annual summaries to consumers or to the state. Thus, 
although they are similar in that they seek to increase the salience of the use tax, 
they do not take complete advantage of the information-reporting aspects of the 
Colorado law. 
Beyond these limited activities, states have done very little to systematically 
encourage knowledge of or compliance with their use taxes.189 Some states have 
information pages on their websites and some have sent out informational mailings, 
but those approaches appear to have been of limited scope and not ongoing. For 
example, the Alabama Department of Revenue recently sent letters to taxpayers who 
left the use-tax line item on their income tax return blank. 190  At one point, 
approximately a third of taxpayers who received the letters subsequently reported 
and paid tax,191 but the state abandoned the program.192 Indiana, Massachusetts, and 
Rhode Island have also sent informational letters to taxpayers in recent decades.193 
In 2006, Maine went further and initiated a compliance program that included letters, 
television advertisements, and a safe harbor that eliminated interest on past-due 
liabilities.194  That effort increased tax reporting approximately three-fold in the 
                                                 
184 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5)(d)(II)(A); COLO. CODE REGS. § 39-21-112-
3.5(3)(a), (c). 
185 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-112(3.5)(d)(II)(A). 
186 On March 3, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a challenge to the Colorado 
legislation in federal court was not barred by the Tax Injunction Act and remanded the case 
to the Tenth Circuit for further consideration. Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl, 135 
S.Ct. 1124 (2015). 
187 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.450 (LexisNexis 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 
1406.1 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-2691(E) (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-63-2 
(Supp. 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 9783 (2013).  
188 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.450(2)(a); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1406.1; S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 12-36-2691(E)(1); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-63-2; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 9783(b).  
189  The State of North Carolina has taken the discussed approaches and also 
unsuccessfully attempted to gather its residents’ purchasing information directly from 
Amazon.com. See Gaylord & Haile, supra note 142, at 2025–39 (discussing the state’s 
attempts to collect use tax and its litigation with Amazon.com over consumer information).  
190 Martin Swant, State of Alabama Sending Tax Notices to Some Consumers for Online, 
Out-of-State Purchases, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Sept. 8, 2010, 10:00 AM), 
http://blog.al.com/businessnews/2010/09/state_of_alabama_sending_tax_n.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/D96X-AACY.  
191 Id. 
192 Maciag, supra note 170. 
193 Manzi, supra note 147, at 9. 
194 Id. at 8–9.  
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years after the program.195 The state ran another compliance program in 2012, but 
did not see as significant of revenue gains.196 To be sure, then, states have taken 
some efforts to promote use-tax compliance, and those efforts have had some 
success. Unfortunately, however, the programs are generally limited in scope and 
duration and fail to fully explore the motivators of use-tax compliance. Current data 
also reflect that previous compliance efforts have failed to have long-standing effect. 
Among the states mentioned in this paragraph, compliance is currently meaningfully 
higher than the average only in Maine.197  
This analysis cannot ignore that there may be political reasons for states to fail 
to enforce their use taxes. The political aversion to tax increases is well known, and 
Republican politicians may find it better to simply let this revenue source stay 
dormant. Discussion of the Act shows that many individuals view use taxes as “new” 
taxes, and enforcement activity could be seen as a violation of an anti-tax pledge.198 
Of course, this does not excuse a system of taxation where consumption in local 
stores is subject to tax while consumption from certain remote vendors is exempt. If 
there are revenue concerns from enforcing the use tax, those should be addressed 
directly rather than maintaining an illogical system of preference toward commercial 
activity with vendors with certain business structures. This also says nothing about 
the distributional aspects of allowing wealthy consumers to avoid the tax by 
shopping online while those without access to reliable Internet, credit, or a stable 
address pay local sales taxes.199 
 
C.  Existing Research on Use-Tax Compliance 
 
The materials above establish that states have taken little effort to promote use-
tax compliance by their taxpayers. Unfortunately, academic analyses and 
                                                 
195 Tom Porter, Maine Tax Amnesty Initiative Fails to Deliver Expected Revenues, THE 
ME. PUB. BROAD. NETWORK (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.mpbn.net/News/MPBNNews/ 
tabid/1159/ctl/ViewItem/mid/3762/ItemId/24924/Default.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
P3EQ-6ZSC (stating that use-tax reporting on individual income-tax returns rose from 
approximately $1 million to $3 million per year after the 2006 program). 
196 Id. The state raised $7 million of revenue from its 2006 program and roughly $1 
million from the 2012 program. Id.  
197 See Manzi, supra note 147, at 13, table 3 (reporting a participation rate of 1.3% in 
Alabama, 0.9% in Indiana, 0.8% in Kentucky, 10.2% in Maine, and 1.8% in Massachusetts).  
198  See Conservatives Oppose the So-Called Marketplace Fairness Act, THE 
HEARTLAND INST., http://heartland.org/no-net-tax, archived at http://perma.cc/P2PY-W3NB 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2015) (compiling statements advocating against the Marketplace 
Fairness Act for reasons including that it would represent a tax increase).  
199 See Thimmesch, supra note 141, at 15 (addressing the variety of equitable concerns 
presented by use-tax nonenforcement).  
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experimentation with respect to that tax have been just as, if not more, sparse. There 
have, however, been a few studies and experiments to consider.200  
One recent study looked at the impact of a use-tax amnesty program offered in 
Illinois and the modification of that state’s personal income-tax return to include a 
use-tax line item. 201  The result of those actions was a meaningful percentage 
increase in use-tax reporting, but not compliance by a significant part of the 
population. 202  Illinois saw the number of returns reporting use tax rise from 
approximately 8,000 in 2009 to more than 240,000 in 2010.203 The increased filings, 
however, represented only approximately 4.5% of returns in Illinois. 204  The 
researchers recognized that increased knowledge of the tax might have been 
responsible for increased reporting, but they felt that the overall low levels of 
compliance suggested that it was “probably more plausible” to attribute the lack of 
compliance to the lack of enforcement rather than to a lack of knowledge.205 
Some other findings from the study are particularly worthy of note. First, the 
majority of taxpayers reporting use taxes reported the exact amount of tax as the 
estimate provided on the state’s lookup table.206 This may suggest that compliance 
increased simply because the state reduced the administrative costs of compliance. 
It is also interesting to note, however, that the instructions to the state’s income-tax 
return included a statement in the use-tax section that “[w]e conduct routine audits 
based on information received from third parties, including the U.S. Customs 
Service and other states.”207 It is thus possible that there was a deterrent effect that 
caused the increase in compliance as well.208  
Other observations relevant to this Article include that taxpayers were actually 
less likely to pay the tax if they used a tax-return preparer.209 Also, the researchers 
found no relationship between the taxpayer’s “tax position” (i.e., whether they owed 
tax or were owed a refund) and whether they reported use tax.210 This is interesting 
                                                 
200 This section focuses on published studies with respect to use-tax compliance by 
individual taxpayers. Studies that evaluate use-tax compliance by businesses address a 
related, but separate question, and are not addressed herein. See Govind S. Iyer et al., 
Increasing Tax Compliance in Washington State: A Field Experiment, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 7, 
14–17 (2010) (evaluating a field experiment on the payment of use taxes by businesses in the 
construction industry).  
201 See Joanna Koh et al., Factors Influencing Use Tax Payment in Illinois 153–54 
(2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/13rescontaxpayment.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/WGW8-CAPD. 
202 See id. at 159.  
203 Id.  
204 See id. at 157–58. 
205 Id. at 154, 160.  
206 Id. at 159. 
207 Id. at 160 n.22. 
208 See supra note 34 (providing a list of sources discussing the impact of third-party 
reporting on tax compliance). 
209 Koh et al., supra note 201, at 160. 
210 See id. at 165.  
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when evaluating the potential impact of the behavioral-economics concepts 
discussed above, which might suggest that taxpayers who are owed a refund may be 
more likely to report use tax because it would be framed as a reduction of a gain 
rather than as a loss.211 Of course, this is not to say that the results disproved the 
impact of loss aversion. How taxpayers frame gains and losses is unclear, and it 
could be simply that taxpayers viewed use-tax payments as losses in any event. 
Experimental results from a study conducted with participants in Illinois and 
Florida are also instructive. That study examined two methods for potentially 
increasing use-tax compliance—allowing consumers to pay the tax voluntarily at the 
point of sale (an “effort remedy”) and providing consumers with information about 
the tax (an “information remedy”).212 The survey was designed such that the two 
methods were tested in isolation from one another and also in conjunction with one 
another. The participants in the study were all asked to make a purchase from a 
fictitious online vendor and to estimate the likelihood that they would pay use tax 
on the purchase.213 They were also asked to rate their level of knowledge of the use 
tax on a scale from 1 (no knowledge) to 7 (very high knowledge).214 The researchers 
then tabulated the results and determined which, if any of the treatments, increased 
compliance.  
Looking first at taxpayer knowledge, participants in the study reported little 
familiarity with the use tax. Nearly 66% of the participants in Florida and 
approximately 37% of the participants in Illinois reported having absolutely no 
knowledge of the tax, and less than 2% of participants in Florida and 11% of 
participants in Illinois reported a high level of knowledge of the tax.215 These low 
levels of knowledge are critically important when analyzing how to increase use-tax 
compliance. One cannot comply with a tax that is unknown if the payment must be 
made through affirmative action by the taxpayer.216 
                                                 
211 See supra Section II.B.3 (discussing framing effects and behavioral economics).  
212  See Christopher R. Jones & Yuyun Sejati, Improving Use Tax Compliance by 
Decreasing Effort and Increasing Knowledge, 11 ATA J. LEGAL TAX RES. 1, 2–3, 7–8 
(2013).  
213 Id. at 8. Those receiving the effort-remedy treatment were also given the option of 
reporting and paying the tax at the point of sale. Id. at 5 
214 Id. at 10. 
215 Id. The authors of the study opined that the differences in knowledge could be 
attributed to the fact that Illinois requires the reporting of use tax on its income-tax return. 
See id. at 9. Florida has no income tax, so the state cannot increase knowledge of the tax 
through that method. 
216 These results are consistent with other studies showing that knowledge of the use tax 
is incredibly low. See Two-Thirds of Consumers Are Confused by Online Sales-Tax 
Compliance, CENTER OF SHOPPING (July 28, 2011), http://www.thecenterofshopping.com/ 
blog/two-thirds-of-consumers-are-confused-by-online-sales-tax-compliance, archived at 
http://perma.cc/NV3V-F2PT; Geoffrey Propheter, Use Tax Awareness and Compliance: A 
Survey Analysis, 65 ST. TAX NOTES 257, 258 tbl.1 (July 23, 2012).  
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The results of the treatments in the study are also instructive. The use of both 
treatments in conjunction resulted in a self-reported compliance rate of 61% in 
Florida and 87% in Illinois.217 Participants who received only the effort remedy 
reported compliance at the rate of 48% in Florida and 76% in Illinois. 218  The 
application of the information remedy alone caused reported compliance at a rate of 
25% in Florida and 28% in Illinois.219 When none of the treatments were applied, 
compliance rates were 21% in Florida and 41% in Illinois.220 
These data are interesting in several respects. First, the participants either 
significantly overstated the extent of their compliance, or they were not a 
representative sample of the population. Nearly 7% of Florida participants and 
nearly 22% of Illinois participants reported having paid use tax before the study.221 
Additionally, in the study itself, 21% of the Florida participants and 41% of the 
Illinois participants who received no treatment reported that they would pay the use 
tax.222 As discussed above, however, real-world compliance rates are nowhere near 
those levels.223 Specifically, we know that actual compliance rates in Illinois were 
less than 5% after the use-tax line item was included on the state’s income-tax 
return.224 We can thus fairly question the overall utility of the results of the study.225  
Notwithstanding these problems, there are still many noteworthy results from 
the study. First, it is interesting that the application of both remedies, in conjunction 
with one another, had more impact than the application of either alone. Second, the 
application of the effort remedy alone had more impact than the application of the 
information remedy alone. Finally, the Illinois participants actually reported a lower 
likelihood of compliance after having received the information treatment than when 
receiving no treatment at all.226 Stating that final result in another way, receiving 
information about the use tax actually caused fewer Illinois participants to report 
that they would pay the tax. This result is in conflict with the actual experience of 
                                                 
217 Jones & Sejati, supra note 212, at 12 tbl.4. 
218 Id.  
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 10 tbl.2.  
222 Id. at 12 tbl.4. 
223 The participants in the study included 122 undergraduate and graduate business 
students in Florida and a total of 110 faculty members, college staff, and graduate and 
undergraduate students in Illinois. Id. at 8. It is possible that use-tax compliance among those 
groups is meaningfully higher than among the general population and that these survey results 
are thus not out of line with observed compliance in the real world. Unfortunately, however, 
the data that have been compiled on use-tax compliance are not that granular (or have not 
been reported as such), so we cannot currently assess that possibility. 
224 See Koh et al., supra note 201, at 158. 
225 The authors also recognize that the participants may have misrepresented the extent 
to which they would comply. Jones & Sejati, supra note 212, at 15 n.21.  
226 Id. at 12, tbl.4.  
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Illinois after it engaged in efforts to increase the salience of its tax, 227  but is 
remarkable. States and researchers should be cognizant of this result as they work to 
increase use-tax compliance through affirmative efforts in the field.  
Another recent laboratory experiment evaluated the relationship between use-
tax compliance, social norms, and states’ enforcement efforts.228 The researcher 
surveyed a group of 245 college business students regarding their views on why they 
comply with their use-tax obligations, how they felt about paying those taxes, their 
beliefs on how others felt about paying those taxes, their understanding of states’ 
enforcement efforts and penalties for use-tax noncompliance, and their personal use-
tax reporting behavior.229 The study found that the participants were more likely to 
have paid use tax based on their own internal pressures than on the external 
enforcement pressures imposed by states. However, perceptions of audit probability 
and sanction severity did positively impact compliance. 230  The author thus 
recommended that states interested in increasing use-tax compliance focus their 
efforts on enhancing residents’ trust of the taxing authority and on increasing 
“service-oriented interaction[s]” with taxpayers rather than increasing audits and 
penalties.231 
Despite the relevance of the results from this experiment, we must again be 
mindful of the study’s limitations. First, participants in the study were drawn from 
one particular segment of the population—college students studying business.232 
Additionally, we are unable to judge the veracity of the participants’ responses by 
comparing them to existing compliance data because the study did not provide the 
raw data on participants’ reported use-tax compliance. However, our ability to draw 
broad inferences from the study would be questionable either way. If a significant 
percentage of participants reported having paid the tax, we would necessarily be 
suspicious of their answers. In contrast, if an expected amount (less than 10%) 
reported having previously paid the tax, the data on the motivators of existing 
compliance would be gathered from fewer than 25 people. The conclusions that 
could be drawn from that sample size are thus limited, at best.233 Finally, it should 
be unsurprising that the participants who reported paying use tax were more likely 
to have done so due to internal norms rather than due to external enforcement efforts. 
                                                 
227 See supra text accompanying notes 201–211. 
228 Xin Liu, Use Tax Compliance: The Role of Norms, Audit Probabilities, and Sanction 
Severity, 18 ACAD. ACCT. & FIN. STUD. J. 65, 69–70 (2014).  
229 Id. at 70–73. 
230 See id. at 75.  
231 Id. at 76.  
232 Id. at 70.  
233 Of course, it would again be helpful to know if real-world use-tax compliance is 
meaningfully higher within the group represented in this particular survey than within the 
general population, but that level of detail has not been reported in any use-tax study known 
to this author. The lack of that information adds to the difficulty of drawing general inferences 
from studies like the one discussed.  
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As noted herein, external enforcement efforts have been virtually nonexistent so they 
have not had an opportunity to induce compliance.  
Another interesting study on use-tax compliance was conducted in conjunction 
with the Nebraska Department of Revenue.234 That study involved the mailing of 
postcards to one thousand taxpayers in the state. 235  The postcards contained a 
statement reminding the recipients of a new line on the state income-tax return for 
reporting use-tax liabilities.236 The postcard also affirmatively encouraged taxpayers 
to report their use-tax liabilities.237 The income-tax returns filed by those taxpayers 
were then compared to a sample of returns filed by taxpayers who did not receive 
the communication.238 
The data from the study showed that the provision of the postcards more than 
doubled the reporting rate from 0.7% of filers to 1.6% of filers.239 The percentage 
increase in reporting taxpayers was thus meaningful, but the nominal reporting rate 
was “still abysmally low.”240 The author of the study thus notes skepticism that a 
postcard nudge would have a meaningful impact and concludes that compliance 
efforts like the one used in the study “will fail to generate significant improvements 
in revenue collection.”241 
 
D.  Summary 
 
The use-tax gap is significant. Existing state efforts to close that gap have been 
focused on getting vendors to collect the tax at the point of sale, but those efforts 
have been largely unsuccessful. Further, even if states’ fortunes change and 
Congress passes the Marketplace Fairness Act, it does not appear as though more 
than half of the use-tax gap would be closed unless the small-seller exception is 
significantly modified or eliminated. How then can states get consumers to 
voluntarily pay that tax? Very little experimental research has been done specifically 
on use taxes, and that research has been of limited scope and is inconclusive. 
Additional efforts and research are thus warranted. The following section provides 
                                                 
234  John E. Anderson, Paying the State Use Tax: Is a ‘Nudge’ Enough? at *5 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Utah Law Review).  
235 Id. at *4.  
236 Id. 
237 Id.  
238 Id.  
239 Id. at *7.  
240 Id. Despite these results, it may be difficult to take any broad lessons from the study. 
Professor Anderson notes that the results were skewed because the taxpayers chosen to 
receive the postcards did not represent a representative sample of the population. Id. at *11 
(reporting oversampling with respect to income level, filing status, and family size). Whether 
the experiment would have produced more meaningful results if the state had chosen a more 
representative sample of taxpayers is unknown. 
241 Id. at *14.  
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the foundation for those efforts by discussing the variety of ways in which the 
models of tax compliance could be used to address these issues.  
 
IV.  APPLYING THE MODELS OF TAX COMPLIANCE TO USE TAXES 
 
Having reviewed the tax-compliance literature and the limited data on use-tax 
compliance, it is easy to see a number of factors that stand in the way of closing the 
use-tax gap. Taxpayer knowledge of the tax is very low, the costs of noncompliance 
are virtually nonexistent, and the effort for taxpayers to comply is high. The 
government has thus failed to establish any reason for taxpayers to believe in its 
competency to enforce the tax, and there has been no opportunity for a compliance 
norm to develop. Notwithstanding these problems, however, states must dedicate 
efforts to induce voluntary compliance if they want to close the use-tax gap.  
The models of tax compliance discussed above fortunately provide us with a 
number of methods with which states could experiment. Of course, because there is 
no single model that predicts behavior for all taxpayers, states must consider a 
number of strategies. In this regard, it may be helpful initially to consider the 
different categories of noncompliant taxpayers. Those include taxpayers who do not 
comply because they are unaware of their obligations, those who do not comply 
because they do not feel that the penalties are sufficient to deter them, and those who 
do not comply simply because they do not wish to be the only fool paying the tax.242 
Each of these groups will respond to different stimuli, and therefore, a multitude of 
approaches must be considered. 
The following materials set forth many ways that states could apply tax-
compliance research to help generate consumer compliance with their use taxes, but 
is far from comprehensive. The intent of this section is not to set forth a complete 
plan for obtaining a use-tax compliance norm, but to illustrate that states have many 
available options. What is important is to recognize that the models of tax 
compliance can be applied in a multitude of ways, often in conjunction with one 
another, and in different forms by different states. The current acceptance of a 
noncompliant norm simply ignores the vast opportunities available in this area.  
The following sections specifically discuss (A) how to increase consumer 
knowledge of the use tax in an effective and procedurally just manner, (B) how to 
economically deter use-tax noncompliance, and (C) how to appeal to taxpayers’ 
nonpecuniary interests. 
 
                                                 
242  See generally Valerie Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Taxation: 
Introduction, 29 LAW & POL’Y 3 (2007) (discussing the application of the concept of 
responsive regulation to tax administration and providing a pyramid approach to tax 
enforcement that recognizes the different motivational postures of taxpayers); Henk Elffers, 
But Taxpayers Do Cooperate!, in COOPERATION IN MODERN SOCIETY: PROMOTING THE 
WELFARE OF COMMUNITIES, STATES AND ORGANIZATIONS 184, 185–188 (Mark Van Vugt et 
al. eds., 2000) (setting out a “WBAD” model that takes into account the different categories 
of noncompliant taxpayers).  
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A.  Information as the First Step for Use-Tax Compliance 
 
As discussed above, knowledge of the use tax is very low. Thus, despite the 
apparent primacy of the deterrence model, states would likely benefit from first 
ensuring that use taxes and consumers’ responsibilities with respect to those taxes 
are simply more salient. Knowledge of a tax is a necessary predicate to one’s 
decision of whether to comply, and providing taxpayers with information is not only 
logical, but would comport with notions of procedural justice. Attempting to 
“shock” compliance through aggressive enforcement actions would likely be 
perceived as procedurally unjust and undermine citizens’ beliefs regarding the 
legitimacy of government power.243 
The biggest question for states with respect to increasing knowledge of the use 
tax is how to undertake such an educational campaign in a way that reaches a critical 
mass of taxpayers. States’ efforts thus far have been of little effect, so new 
approaches are needed. One potential avenue that states could use to obtain wider 
knowledge of the tax is to leverage the attention recently given to the Marketplace 
Fairness Act. States should work to ensure that articles addressing that legislation 
(or its demise) specifically discuss consumers’ responsibilities with respect to use 
taxes. Those stories would at least reach the segment of the population interested 
enough to read about that legislation.  
                                                 
243 See supra text accompanying notes 93–103. On these points, one need look no 
further than the IRS’ recent experience with its voluntary disclosure program related to 
taxpayer reporting of foreign bank accounts on a form known as an FBAR, the Report of 
Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts. The IRS has undergone several rounds of so-called 
voluntary disclosure programs with respect to the FBAR, and the penalties under those 
programs have generally risen with each iteration of the program. See NAT’L TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 228 (2013), available at 
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/2013FullReport/Volume-1.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/KPH3-FBTW [hereinafter 2013 REPORT]. The programs offered reduced 
penalty exposure for individuals who had willfully failed to file the reports, but imposed more 
strict penalties than would have otherwise been faced by nonwillful violators. Id. Because of 
the threat of significant sanction, however, many individuals who were nonwillful violators 
felt compelled to participate rather than opt out and undergo a normal audit procedure. Id.; 
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 137 (2012), available at 
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-Annual-Report/downloads/Volume-1.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8L4C-KAEH. The IRS Taxpayer Advocate noted the unfairness 
of the situation, which resulted in “benign actors” being treated less favorably than “bad 
actors.” See 2013 REPORT, supra, at 232–33. She thus suggested several procedural steps to 
“improve[e] the fairness of the tax system, restor[e] respect for the IRS, and improve[e] 
voluntary compliance,” specifically referencing the impact of procedural justice 
considerations on voluntary compliance. Id. at 235–36. Those suggestions included reducing 
the burden of complying and providing taxpayer education. Id. Somewhat amazingly, she felt 
compelled to state that the IRS should provide clear guidance on what accounts are reportable 
before actually requiring taxpayers to report them. Id. at 236. That this had to be said is 
unfortunate and remarkable. 
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States should also specifically direct communications and efforts to tax-return 
preparers.244 More than half of taxpayers use third-party preparers, who likely make 
the first decision of how to approach the use-tax issue—especially in those states 
where use tax is reported on the income-tax return.245 As noted above, however, data 
from Illinois show that people who use tax-return preparers reported use tax at a 
lesser rate than the general population.246 Targeting an educational program at those 
preparers, who would then presumably educate their clients, would be an efficient 
way of reaching many taxpayers—and perhaps a necessary step. States simply must 
ensure that preparers take use taxes seriously and encourage their clients to do so as 
well.247  
                                                 
244 Professor Lavoie has previously advocated for using the tax bar and accounting 
profession to shift cultural norms more generally. Richard Lavoie, Flying Above the Law and 
Below the Radar: Instilling a Taxpaying Ethos in Those Playing by Their Own Rules, 29 
PACE L. REV. 637, 678–81 (2009) (discussing the benefit of “co-opting lawyers and other 
professional advisors as . . . agents of change”). Of course, those providers may be subject to 
the same noncompliance pressures of the clients whom they serve. Just as a contractor may 
feel economically compelled to “cheat” like its competitors lest it suffer a competitive 
disadvantage, a tax-return preparer that demands strict compliance in a culture that demands 
no such exaction could soon find his client list dwindling. This can be counteracted only by 
professional requirements imposed on those professionals. See infra note 247 (discussing 
potential professional sanctions on return prepares who fail to conduct adequate diligence on 
consumers’ liabilities).  
245 See 2013 REPORT, supra note 243, at 98 (estimating that 60% of taxpayers will use 
tax professionals to help file returns in 2013); Patrick Langetieg et al., Return Preparer 
Industry Analysis, IRS 17, 19 tbl.1 (2013), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/13resconreturn 
prepar.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3W5R-T88J (reporting that, in 2013, 80.99 million of 
141.7 million individual returns were prepared returns). 
246 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
247 States could take guidance from the federal government’s program with respect to 
the earned income tax credit (“EITC”). Federal law includes specific penalties for preparers 
who fail to exercise due diligence in determining eligibility for, or the amount of, those 
credits. 26 U.S.C. § 6695(g) (2013). The IRS also hosts a website informing preparers of the 
due diligence required and conducts audits of preparers who exhibit high levels of EITC 
errors. EITC Due Diligence Law and Regulation, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT & OTHER 
REFUNDABLE CREDITS (last updated Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.eitc.irs.gov/Tax-Preparer-
Toolkit/dd/lawandregs, archived at http://perma.cc/DG2Q-ECJY; Auditing for Due 
Diligence Compliance, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT & OTHER REFUNDABLE CREDITS (last 
updated Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.eitc.irs.gov/Tax-Preparer-Toolkit/compliance/auditing, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Q7AW-LQY8. States could use this model to similarly focus on 
return-preparer processes rather than on individual taxpayers’ reporting behaviors. Although 
states may not implement penalties similar to the EITC due diligence penalty, targeted 
communications with preparers could provide some level of positive pressure on preparers’ 
levels of encouragement to taxpayers to pay their use taxes. At the very least, states should 
not ignore preparers who routinely file a high percentage of their returns reporting no use tax 
due. 
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Reaching self-filers may be more difficult, but the use of social media, 
traditional media, and the tax authorities’ own publications could be used in an 
intentional way to bring about a sufficient level of knowledge of the tax. Automatic 
notices provided online, like the one used by Michigan, could also prove to be very 
helpful.248 States could also send notices to taxpayers who fail to report any use tax 
on their income-tax returns. Those notices would not rise to the level of audit letters, 
but would raise taxpayer awareness of the tax and could invite compliance in a 
manner that uses procedural-justice concepts and builds trust in government.249 
These efforts would impose some costs on states, but providing taxpayers with a 
base level of knowledge of the use tax in advance of other enforcement action would 
be consistent with most psychological research on tax compliance. Evidence from 
Alabama shows that this simple approach can produce meaningful gains.250 The 
recent study in Nebraska also shows that such efforts are likely to at least pay for 
themselves.251 
Government education about use taxes should also make use of the potential 
power of social norms and normative appeals. Information regarding the equity of 
the tax, the uses for the funds, and the overall levels of tax compliance in the state 
would serve to harness or promote social norms. 252  Concurrently, providing 
information regarding the potential penalties and audit activity would remind 
taxpayers of their economic interest in complying. Using a variety of approaches to 
these communications could give researchers and states valuable insight into which 
types of appeals produce the best results. Given the different results from prior 
experiments with normative appeals,253 experimentation in this area could help to 
provide valuable guidance going forward. 
Of course, education alone is not sufficient and, as discussed above, at least one 
research experiment shows that it could be detrimental.254 States will thus need to 
couple their educational reforms with other tactics. Again, the goal of these efforts 
is to build a norm of compliance through procedurally just methods such that 
aggressive actions aimed at the entire population are not needed.  
 
B.  Deterrence and Use-Tax Compliance 
 
The research discussed above establishes the general effectiveness of the 
deterrence model, at least when some baseline conditions are met. First, there must 
                                                 
248 See supra notes 174–176 and accompanying text.  
249  See generally Wenzel, supra note 97 (discussing the use of procedural-justice 
considerations in reminder letters to improve voluntary compliance).  
250 See supra notes 190–192 and accompanying text.  
251 See Anderson, supra note 234, at 14.  
252 Naturally, any use of a descriptive norm statement must necessarily incorporate 
overall levels of tax compliance. Until a use-tax compliance norm is achieved, states must 
take great care to avoid the reality that virtually no one pays use tax.  
253 See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text.  
254 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.  
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be some appreciable risk that deviants will be caught and punished. Second, because 
audit and penalty rates are generally too low to effectively impact the expected-
utility analysis of tax evasion, withholding and information reporting are critical in 
motivating compliance. Unfortunately for the use tax, none of these conditions are 
currently met. States should remedy this situation before or concurrently with efforts 
to test the more modern models of tax compliance.  
 
1.  Audit Risk and Use Taxes 
 
No amount of research can change the reality that use-tax audits are unlikely to 
pay for themselves on an individual basis. Taxpayer liabilities are too small and 
audits too costly. Research does suggest, however, that audit activity would be 
beneficial and could act to promote compliance in other ways that might help offset 
their cost.  
First, states must consider the potential for an indirect audit effect. As discussed 
above, audits impact not only the taxpayers being audited, but others as well.255 
Taxpayers hearing of increased (or newly initiated) use-tax audits may increase their 
own perception of audit risk, perhaps beyond the actual audit risk. Audit activity can 
thus generate revenue beyond the additional assessments generated directly by those 
examinations.  
Audits, alone, can also act as a type of collateral sanction on noncompliance 
beyond the statutory penalties. No taxpayer wants to undergo the hassle of an audit, 
much less one that will require them to review their annual purchase data by going 
through stacks of credit card and bank statements. The burden of a full audit for a 
liability as small as a use-tax liability could thus function as an effective collateral 
sanction for use-tax noncompliance.256  
Of course, any effort to increase audit risk (real or perceived) should take 
procedural-justice considerations into account. Directed audit activity may be 
detrimental to overall taxpayer beliefs about the fairness of the tax system and the 
trustworthiness of the tax administrator and could impact taxpayer compliance more 
broadly. Increasing audit rates or the perception of audit rates must therefore be done 
very carefully. A state may be well advised to adopt a broad, soft approach rather 
than an approach that appears to target an unlucky few.257 Thus, a system that 
generated an inquiry letter in response to returns reporting no use tax or use-tax 
liabilities falling below some expectation may be able to best harness the impact of 
the deterrence effect of audit activity. Taxpayers should fairly expect an inquiry if 
                                                 
255 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
256  See generally Blank, supra note 4 (discussing collateral sanctions for tax 
noncompliance).  
257 Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions 
and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT 193, 214 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992). 
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they report no tax due, and paying the required use tax in response would almost 
surely be an acceptable price to avoid the pain of an audit. 
 
2.  Penalizing Noncompliance 
 
Changing the penalties owed for use-tax violations would certainly impact the 
general cost-benefit analysis of a taxpayer determining whether to avoid the tax. 
Unfortunately, however, there are likely significant hurdles to taking that action. The 
first is that increasing penalties would be difficult from a political perspective, 
especially with respect to a tax that many would consider to be new. The second 
problem is that penalties are generally based on the amount of evaded tax. Because 
use-tax liabilities are generally low, a penalty of that type is unlikely to compel 
compliance. Modifying the applicable penalties would thus likely require other 
forms of redress.  
Other than the obvious suggestions of raising the penalty rates or adopting 
higher flat penalties for noncompliance, states could also explore more unique forms 
for their penalties. They could, for example, impose the penalty through an income-
tax surcharge to take advantage of the salience of that tax, or they could penalize 
noncomplaint taxpayers by eliminating certain income-tax benefits to test whether 
the endowment effect would apply to those benefits.258 States could also test the 
intentional use of collateral tax sanctions (beyond the pain of audit discussed above).  
As identified by Professor Blank, those sanctions generally have “three primary 
characteristics.”259 First, “they rescind or deny a government benefit or privilege. . . 
.”260 Second, “they are enforced by an agency other than the taxing authority. . . .”261 
Finally, “they apply in addition to the formal tax penalty. . . . ”262 Examples include 
denial or revocation of a passport, deportation, denial of housing assistance, and the 
revocation of licenses like driver, professional, liquor, or recreational licenses.263 
Professor Blank identified a number of reasons that such sanctions may be more 
effective than monetary penalties based on the existing models of tax compliance,264 
and he proposed some “guiding principles” for governments seeking to implement 
such sanctions effectively. 265  Those sanctions, for example, may be more 
                                                 
258  See supra note 132 and accompanying text (providing information about the 
endowment effect).  
259 Blank, supra note 4, at 735.  
260 Id. 
261 Id. 
262 Id.  
263 Id. at 736–44.  
264 Id. at 749–68. Those include the fact that such penalties may be more salient to 
taxpayers, they may take advantage of various cognitive biases, they may impose greater 
economic costs, they may emit negative reputational signals, they improve feelings of 
reciprocity and retributive justice, and they reinforce tax compliance as one of the duties of 
being a citizen. Id.  
265 Id. at 774–80 
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appropriate where the tax offense relates to a clear, specific obligation rather than a 
looser standard,266 should be imposed only when the taxing authority defines and 
identifies a violation of the tax law,267 and should be proportionate in magnitude to 
the tax offense.268  
Under this structure, collateral consequences for use-tax noncompliance could 
be properly considered by states. First, the requirement to pay use taxes is a clear 
rule.269 Second, the taxing authority could certainly take responsibility for defining 
and identifying violations. The easiest method under current practice would be to 
simply note when a taxpayer reports absolutely no use tax due and trigger the 
sanction until the taxpayer reports some good faith amount or establishes the fact of 
no liability. The most difficult aspect of that approach would be to find a collateral 
sanction that is proportionate to the failure to pay use tax. The loss of a driver or 
professional license is likely too large of a penalty for an unpaid tax that probably 
would amount to less than $200. States could, however, make renewal of those 
licenses less pleasant for those who do not comply. Requiring an in-person 
application or renewal process in lieu of a computer-based process, for example, 
may impose a significant enough cost that individuals may prefer to report their use 
taxes. States could undoubtedly find other public conveniences that could be 
provided only to those who care to share in the cost. What is important is that they 
can think beyond traditional monetary penalties when evaluating how to improve 
use-tax compliance.  
 
3.  Addressing the Costs of Complying 
 
Increasing the costs of noncompliance might very well help to induce some 
taxpayers to pay use taxes, but, as a practical matter, states may be unwilling to 
increase audit activity or penalties. The former would require a significant 
expenditure of resources, and the latter would require legislative action, which may 
be difficult to obtain. It may be more likely then, that states could address taxpayers’ 
cost-benefit analyses by addressing the costs of compliance rather than the costs of 
noncompliance.270 Regardless of how people feel about tax obligations, they will not 
                                                 
266 Id. at 774.  
267 Id. at 776–77.  
268 Id. at 777–80.  
269 Id. at 783 (noting that “[t]he requirement to file a tax return is an explicit tax rule, 
not a tax standard”).  
270 Reducing compliance costs may not only be a more pragmatic approach, but it might 
also be essential in developing a social norm of compliance. Research on social norms in the 
context of recycling has shown that the effectiveness of social norms is significantly impacted 
by the amount of effort required of an individual. See Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 
CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1276–80, 1295–96 (2001) (discussing the impact of structural changes 
that made participation in recycling programs more convenient and concluding that such 
efforts were both “more effective than most persuasive techniques aimed at increasing 
participation” and “result[ed] in sustained behavioral change”). Indeed, Professor Carlson 
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comply if it is too burdensome given the amounts of tax at issue. The benefit of 
complying can simply be overwhelmed by the costs of doing so. 
This is a legitimate concern with respect to use taxes. Paying those taxes 
requires people to track their annual purchase activity and to determine (1) which of 
their purchases had no tax collected at the point of sale, (2) whether any of the 
purchases were tax exempt, and (3) the amount of tax that is owed. All but the final 
task could be quite difficult. Why would anyone suffer through those tasks to pay a 
tax that is likely relatively small and that will not be enforced? States cannot ignore 
this reality. They must work to change the costs of compliance or at least the 
perception of those costs if they want to induce taxpayer compliance.  
Fortunately for states, compliance may not be nearly as costly as many 
consumers assume. The most significant online retailer in the United States, 
Amazon.com, allows consumers to view their annual purchases with relative ease 
within their account information.271 If consumers just compiled that data, they could 
likely determine a significant percentage of their taxable purchases in less than an 
hour. Of course, a variation of the Pareto principle probably applies. Consumers will 
likely be able to find 80% of their online purchases with 20% of the work that it 
would require them to find 100% of their purchases. For states, 80% would be 
significant—perhaps even acceptable.  
States could also work to change the actual costs of complying, for example, 
by allowing taxpayers to report use tax based on tables or reducing the types of 
transactions subject to the use tax.272 One could also imagine an enterprising state or 
consortium of states developing an in-browser app that would allow consumers to 
track and aggregate their use-tax data while they are making online purchases. 
                                                 
concluded that strengthening social norms may be fruitless unless government can make 
compliance simpler. Id. at 1299. Use-tax payments and recycling arguably share many 
characteristics as large-number, small-scale collective action problems, but recycling 
programs benefit from widespread public support that additional taxation does not. States 
may thus benefit less from reducing the costs of compliance with respect to use taxes than 
has been seen with respect to recycling programs. See id. at 1281–82 (noting that “caution 
seems due in extrapolating” the conclusions from analysis of recycling data to “problems 
whose resolution lacks similar widespread support”). Of course, states could also attempt to 
change the existing aversion to additional taxation by educating taxpayers on the broad 
benefits that could be derived from wide-spread use-tax compliance, whether in the form of 
increased funding for items of need, deficit reductions, or funds available for tax cuts in other 
areas.  
271  Users are able to view their purchases from that retailer within their account 
information. That information can be viewed by calendar year. See Your Orders, AMAZON, 
www.amazon.com (last visited June 27, 2015) (a user must log in and click on the “Your 
Account,” then the “Your Orders” button to view this option).  
272 See Thimmesch, supra note 141, at 42–46 (discussing how states could modify their 
use-tax systems to make compliance simpler for taxpayers). As noted above, average 
participation is significantly increased when tables are provided to taxpayers. See supra note 
180 and accompanying text.  
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Pursuing that type of option would be novel and costly, but the potential tax-revenue 
gains may justify the investment given the revenue estimates that states are touting.  
A more aggressive method of reducing the costs of compliance and promoting 
compliance under the deterrence model would be to implement an information-
reporting system like that adopted by Colorado.273 As discussed above, much of our 
system of tax compliance works because of the intervention of third parties. That 
traditionally takes the form of withholding at the source and information reporting 
to the taxing authority. States have thus far focused their efforts on the former, and 
the Marketplace Fairness Act would certainly make great strides on that point. 
However, states could put more energy into the latter—information reporting.  
The materials above discussed a number of states that have attempted some 
form of information reporting, and the most extensive of those requirements—
imposed by Colorado—is currently subject to legal proceedings to determine its 
constitutionality.274 That challenge is based on concerns regarding state power under 
the Dormant Commerce Clause and concerns regarding taxpayer privacy.275 Each of 
those concerns can likely be addressed within a system that still promotes voluntary 
compliance.  
First, the issues regarding states’ powers to compel out-of-state vendors to 
provide information reports are largely based upon Quill and the effect of the 
physical-presence rule. As the Quill court made clear, however, Congress can 
override that rule through affirmative action under its Commerce Clause power.276 
Thus, instead of waiting for litigation to bless such statutes, one option for states 
would be to lobby Congress for the power to require vendors to provide information 
reports to their customers. That approach may prove to be a good compromise 
between states and retailers. Neither group would prefer this approach, but it might 
be a good second-best solution.277 States would prefer that approach to nothing, and 
merchants would likely prefer it to the passage of the Marketplace Fairness Act. 
Remote vendors would still face the difficulty and costs of providing the notices, but 
they would not be subject to the intrusive and costly audits that come as a part of 
being a tax collector.  
To address the privacy concerns inherent in an information-reporting system, 
Congress could allow states to require vendors to provide information reports to 
consumers, but prevent states from requiring that their tax authorities receive a copy 
as well. The level of detail that those reports contain can be troubling. This is true 
                                                 
273 See supra notes 181–185 and accompanying text.  
274 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.  
275 John Buhl, DMA Sues Colorado Over ‘Amazon Law’, 57 ST. TAX NOTES, July 2010, 
at 12. See also Gaylord & Haile, supra note 142, at 2039–60, 2084–91 (analyzing the First 
Amendment concerns with vendor disclosure to states). 
276 See supra note 13. 
277 Of course, one cannot ignore the practical difficulties of getting Congress to act in 
such a way, or at all. Hopefully, however, action would be more likely if states and retailers 
approached Congress with a resolution that was acceptable to both.  
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even if individual purchase data is removed.278 Individual expression may be chilled 
simply by the government knowing that taxpayers shop with certain retailers—
perhaps those specializing in controversial political, religious, or sexual products.279 
A more restrained information-reporting requirement would avoid those concerns.  
Some might understandably be worried that an information report provided 
only to consumers would be ineffective and reject this suggestion on that ground. 
One could easily surmise that information reports are of benefit precisely because 
they provide government with the information necessary to determine a tax liability. 
Fortunately, recent research suggests that much of the benefit of information 
reporting could be obtained without requiring vendors to send consumer information 
to the state. For example, the research on compliance with the VAT in Chile 
suggested that the mere presence of a paper trail induces compliance, even if the 
government is not automatically provided a copy of the documents that make up that 
trail.280  
Finally, it should be noted that this type of federal approach might be preferable 
to the Marketplace Fairness Act because it would make the use tax more salient to 
taxpayers and impress upon them the extent of their obligations to pay. That 
approach would thus promote compliance with respect to all taxable items, rather 
than just capture revenue from purchases made from retailers subject to the 
Marketplace Fairness Act.  
 
C.  Increasing Compliance Through Appeals to Nonpecuniary Interests 
 
The efforts discussed above would respond to the traditional economic model 
for tax compliance, and those efforts would seem highly advisable given the large 
predictive power of that model. Of course, states are undertaking some of those steps 
already. Many states are undertaking publicity efforts.281 They are also making it 
easier to pay that tax, some by putting a use-tax line on their income-tax returns and 
some by providing charts to show average amounts owed.282 As a first step, states 
and researchers should expand those efforts and also evaluate the existing 
compliance data more closely to determine the different reporting rates among 
states. Existing data show that certain states have been able to generate much higher 
levels of compliance than others. 283  Isolating the factors that have caused that 
difference could provide significant information to states, researchers, and the 
federal government.  
Ultimately, though, the same basic structural flaw that haunts use taxes today 
may prevent the extension of existing efforts from increasing compliance—each 
                                                 
278 See Gaylord & Haile, supra note 142, at 2084–91. 
279 Id. at 2085.  
280 See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text.  
281 See supra Section III.B. 
282 Id.  
283 See supra notes 147–155 and accompanying text.  
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individual consumer simply does not have enough tax at issue to make state 
enforcement efforts seem credible. The success of state efforts in that area will thus 
depend on gaining that credibility, which may mean more enforcement dollars spent 
than taxes collected in the short term. For these reasons, significant attention should 
also be given to the nonpecuniary models of compliance discussed above. A few 
suggestions are offered below.284 These include (1) providing taxpayer voice in the 
use-tax context, and (2) applying behavioral theories to the use tax. 
 
1.  Taxpayer Voice 
 
One of the most intriguing opportunities for states to apply current tax-
compliance research appears to be with respect to the value of voice in tax 
compliance. Giving taxpayers a voice, in the form of gathering taxpayer opinions on 
matters related to taxation and budgeting, has been found to increase feelings of 
procedural justice and to increase tax compliance in many experiments.285 That line 
of research thus presents an intriguing opportunity, and states could introduce voice 
into the use-tax system in many ways. Two particular options are discussed below. 
First, states could provide taxpayers with an opportunity to express a preference as 
to the use of their use-tax payments. Second, states could invite taxpayers to simply 
provide their opinions of the tax when they file their returns.  
The idea of voting on the allocation of tax payments is not new. As discussed 
above, researchers have experimented with this in laboratory settings for years.286 
Professor Dan Ariely, a leading behavioral economist, has suggested this 
approach.287 Allowing taxpayers to vote on the use of their taxes provides them a 
voice and a sense of agency in the process. This may be a way to increase use-tax 
compliance without engaging in costly deterrence efforts. Of course, the mechanics 
of implementing such a system will necessarily vary by jurisdiction, but there are 
likely to be some uniform political and economic concerns.  
As an initial matter, allowing taxpayers to determine how their use-tax 
payments will be spent would seem to introduce unacceptable uncertainty into 
states’ budgeting processes. States would not know how their programs would be 
funded, which would impede the proper functioning of state government. Budget 
cycles and efficiency considerations could thus be reasons to reject consideration of 
such an approach. These concerns are appropriate, but not insurmountable. First, 
                                                 
284 Of course, it is important to note that many of the suggestions previously offered 
incorporate, or could incorporate, these appeals to nonpecuniary interests. Information 
campaigns can take advantage of the bulk of literature on the impact of normative appeals in 
information letters. Deterrence efforts should also take procedural-justice considerations into 
account.  
285 See supra notes 104–112 and accompanying text.  
286 See supra notes 108–112 and accompanying text.  
287 Dan Ariely, Celebrating April 15th (17th), DAN ARIELY BLOG (April 17, 2012), 
http://danariely.com/2012/04/17/celebrating-april-15th/, archived at http://perma.cc/D9XQ-
8G3X.  
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because taxpayer voice may have noninstrumental value and because the eliciting of 
taxpayer comment may create a “false consciousness of control,”288 states need not 
necessarily allow taxpayers to make binding allocations of their use-tax payments. 
States could thus experiment with allowing taxpayers to express a preference on how 
their use-tax payments are used without giving up any actual control.289 
State concerns about allowing voice through voting would also appear to be 
unwarranted even if taxpayer allocations were binding. Given that use-tax 
compliance is currently virtually nonexistent, any use-tax funds received due to the 
provision of voice through binding tax allocations would be new revenue. States 
currently do not rely on those funds so any administrative or planning issues would 
come from a surplus of funds. That is hardly a reason to avoid raising the funds in 
the first place.290 Further, to the extent that states do currently receive some use-tax 
revenue or start to receive that revenue after successful attempts to increase 
compliance, they could make clear that the allocations would apply only to a portion 
of the funds collected or perhaps to the increased revenue collected, either on an 
individual or aggregate level.291 Recall that research has shown diminishing returns 
from tax allocations over a certain percentage of the amount owed.292 States could 
also potentially discontinue the practice if a strong enough norm of compliance 
develops.293 Of course, it hardly needs to be mentioned that dollars are fungible. As 
long as the state does not allow citizens to allocate their funds to a new project, the 
money that is allocated under this system could simply offset funding that could be 
directed elsewhere.294  
                                                 
288 Lind et al., supra note 106, at 958.  
289 States, however, should pay attention to the possibility of a “frustration effect” if 
taxpayer allocations are simply ignored. See id. at 953 (“There is evidence that, under some 
circumstances, people actively reject procedures that appear to offer process control but that 
do not provide any real input into the decision-making process.”).  
290 The corollary of this recognition is that experimenting with use-tax compliance is 
relatively risk-free. There is simply little revenue to be lost from attempting a method that is 
unsuccessful.  
291 In this regard, it is important to remember that we are simply trying to create a norm 
of compliance. Once that norm is established, states should be able to rely more on the norm 
and less on the other methods of increasing compliance. See Lavoie, supra note 244, at 674–
76; Leigh Osofsky, Concentrated Enforcement, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 325, 354–55, 371–72 
(2014) (noting the variety of scholarship on norm tipping points and their application to tax 
compliance). The impacts of lessened allocation power would thus be mitigated by the 
development of a compliance norm.  
292 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.  
293  See Jon S. Davis et al., Social Behaviors, Enforcement, and Tax Compliance 
Dynamics, 78 ACCT. REV. 39, 61–63 (2003) (reporting results that suggest that changes in 
enforcement mechanisms may change behavior among noncompliant individuals, but that 
eliminating enforcement will not cause compliant populations to shift to noncompliant). 
294 Of course, the psychological impact of this accounting practice should be considered 
and monitored.  
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Providing voice through tax allocations would also potentially provide more 
political cover for those politicians who would otherwise resist use-tax compliance 
efforts due to the political pressure against “new” taxes. Recent scholarship has 
focused on the impact of earmarked taxes, under which states raise new taxes in 
order to fund specific projects.295 Using a public-choice-theory approach, Professor 
Susannah Camic Tahk has analyzed the relative success of states in raising revenue 
using such taxes.296  
Professor Tahk’s analysis specifically points to the positive impact that 
concentrated benefits have on the likelihood that a tax will be passed or retained, 
especially when the costs of that tax are diffuse.297 Naturally, with targeted benefits, 
a tax has a natural pool of advocates, and, with diffuse costs, potentially no detractors 
with enough interest in fighting the tax. To be sure, this is a different set of factors 
than may be involved when discussing how to increase compliance with an existing 
tax, and Professor Tahk’s observations may not directly support allowing taxpayers 
to allocate their use-tax payments. However, the state experience with earmarked 
taxes does show the benefit of finding public support for new taxing measures 
through the dedication of funds to a particular, popular project or cause. Paying taxes 
to support such a cause is more palatable than simply paying more to a general fund. 
Allowing use-tax filers to allocate their payments would do just that. If states have 
found that citizens are more willing to enact or retain tax provisions when the 
benefits to them are more clear or targeted, it is not irrational to assume that 
individuals would similarly “vote” in favor of the use tax by making a payment that 
is directed to their personally preferred use.  
In all, it appears as though states have every reason to experiment with seeking 
taxpayer preferences as to the allocation of their use-tax payments. There is little 
revenue at risk if the efforts somehow backfire; states have latitude in whether and 
to what extent to make those allocations binding, and those allocations may make 
the use tax more politically acceptable.  
Another way that states could provide taxpayers with a voice is by simply 
inviting comment as part of the tax-filing process. States could affirmatively ask 
taxpayers to comment on the use tax in connection with their annual tax return. 
Although such an approach would clearly give a post-decision voice, 
noninstrumental theories of voice suggest that this approach may increase 
                                                 
295 Susannah Camic Tahk, Making Impossible Tax Reform Possible, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2683, 2686 (2013) [hereinafter Tahk, Making Impossible Tax Reform Possible]; 
Susannah Camic Tahk, Public Choice Theory & Earmarked Taxes, N.Y.U. TAX L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2311 
372, archived at http://perma.cc/6KDR-FRUQ [hereinafter Tahk, Public Choice Theory]. For 
purposes of this line of scholarship, the term “earmarked” refers only to taxes where the use 
of the funds is specifically directed at a particular use or recipient. Tahk, Making Impossible 
Tax Reform Possible, supra, at 2686 n.14; Tahk, Public Choice Theory, supra, at 2.  
296 See generally Tahk, Public Choice Theory, supra note 295, at 2. 
297 See id. at 8 (noting that such laws are “relatively easy to enact” and “relatively easy 
to maintain and to extend”).  
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compliance. This avenue may be especially important in an era where the public 
feels significantly less satisfied with government. Perhaps providing an outlet for 
taxpayer frustration would increase perceptions of procedural justice and increase 
compliance in that way.  
This approach, like others, comes with little risk of reducing use-tax revenues 
because current compliance rates are so low. However, it is worth considering 
whether giving taxpayers an opportunity to “vent” on their return would cause them 
to overweight their negative views of the state taxing authority at the time of their 
return filing. This could manifest itself in more aggressive filing positions. It might 
therefore be advisable, and informative, for states to experiment with respect to the 
structure of the call for comment. For instance, it could be coupled with a statement 
reminding taxpayers of the services that they receive or a normative appeal, or it 
could be detached from the income-tax filing all together.  
 
2.  Behavioral Use Tax 
 
No modern discussion of potential avenues for increasing tax compliance 
would be complete without a discussion of potential application of the behavioral 
sciences. A few options that may apply well in the use-tax context are discussed 
below.  
 
 (a)  Withholding 
 
The use of withholding as a method of increasing compliance is not new. 
Withholding has been offered as a method to take advantage of taxpayers’ general 
aversion to risk taking with respect to gains. As noted above, scholars have thus 
offered “advance payments” as a potential solution to income-tax underreporting for 
purposes of nonwage income for years.298 These theories rest on the idea that once 
tax is withheld, taxpayers are put into a gain position if they seek a refund of those 
amounts. They are thus less likely to take a risky position. This is in contrast to the 
loss position into which they are put if they are required to voluntarily report and 
pay tax on their income at the end of the year.299  
This concept could be applied to use taxes with relative ease for states. States 
already withhold for wage income. They could thus either allocate a portion of the 
already withheld amounts to use taxes, or they could adjust their withholding tables 
to include an amount of use tax. States with use-tax lookup tables already make some 
estimation of use-tax liabilities by reference to taxpayers’ incomes, so this process 
                                                 
298 See supra notes 125–127 and accompanying text.  
299 Of course, these proposals rely on this framing effect holding true for taxpayers. 
Consideration of the procedural-justice implications of purposeful over withholding is also 
required. These issues are thus worth further study. 
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would not be entirely new.300 The biggest challenge to the implementation of this 
approach would appear to be the cost of modifying states’ information-reporting 
systems to accommodate and reflect the allocation of part of the withheld amounts 
to use taxes. The potential benefits, though, appear significant.  
 
 (b)  Other Behavioral Approaches 
 
The application of behavioral approaches to use-tax compliance could take 
myriad forms. One could imagine a state imposing default use-tax liabilities out of 
which taxpayers must affirmatively opt,301 strategically placing a jurat on the tax 
return, or providing an immediate credit for reported use-tax liabilities along with a 
delayed repayment date to take advantage of taxpayer hyperbolic discounting. What 
is clear is that there are a number of ways in which identified decision-making biases 
could be used to help increase use-tax compliance.  
One particularly interesting way in which states and researchers could 
experiment with “choice architecture” in the use-tax context would be to collect and 
analyze data with respect to, or experiment with, the use-tax line item that states 
have placed on their income-tax returns. As discussed above, states have 
implemented that line item in a number of ways. Some simply have a line for 
reporting tax due, some require taxpayers to affirmatively write the word “zero” on 
their return if they are reporting no tax due, while others require taxpayers to simply 
indicate that they have no liability.302 Though compliance rates in those states are 
still very low, it may nonetheless be interesting to analyze whether those different 
forms have resulted in meaningfully different levels of compliance. Beyond 
evaluating existing data, one could imagine states and researchers “nudging” 
consumers in different ways through the use of different design choices with respect 
to the use-tax line item or the use of a use-tax schedule.303 States could also test 
variations of the lookup tables that some provide to taxpayers. Research could 
evaluate whether consumers will always anchor to the number provided in such a 
table or if states could nudge them to look beyond that number instead. States already 
                                                 
300 This approach would necessarily fail to reach those who do not earn wages as 
employees, which may introduce some equity concerns. This should not necessarily counsel 
toward ignoring the potential benefit of withholding, but suggests more careful study and 
analysis into the interactions of the different variables impacting voluntary compliance. A 
state looking into an advance-payment approach for independent contractors could also 
incorporate use-tax payments into that scheme.  
301 The impact of default rules is well established in the behavioral-sciences literature. 
See Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1350–51 
(2011) (discussing the impacts of default rules).  
302 Manzi, supra note 147, at 7–8.  
303 For example, requiring taxpayers to affirmatively attest that they do not owe any use 
tax, or to check a box to that effect, would presumably be more effective than allowing 
taxpayers to simply put a “zero” in the reporting box.  
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use a variety of methods for their use-tax lines on their income-tax returns and their 
lookup tables, but they could do so in a more intentional manner. 
States and researchers could also experiment with using collateral tax 
consequences as a way to harness and evaluate the impact of cognitive biases on tax 
compliance. As discussed above, states can increase the costs of noncompliance by 
imposing sanctions that go beyond simple monetary fines. They could also do so in 
ways that take into account, and experiment with, the impacts of loss aversion and 
the endowment effect.304 For example, states could deny income-tax benefits to 
those who improperly fail to report and pay use taxes. This could test whether the 
loss of an income-tax benefit would create the same psychological impact as the loss 
of another governmental benefit, or whether it would have the same impact as a 
monetary fine. The use of collateral tax consequences was discussed above, but they 
must be mentioned with any analysis of the potential power of behavioral economics 
on use-tax compliance.  
Ultimately, there is significant interest in the application of the behavioral 
sciences into new areas of regulation. State use taxes present many opportunities to 
test the real-world impacts of common behavioral theories.  
 
V.  BEYOND USE TAXES 
 
A.  Opportunities 
 
The discussion in this Article is directly aimed at use-tax compliance, but it 
would be much too shortsighted to ignore the broader impacts that efforts in this area 
could have. The materials above demonstrate that researchers have identified many 
factors that contribute to tax-compliance decisions, but also that there are many areas 
of uncertainty. Not the least of those uncertainties is how the various factors interact 
for different populations of taxpayers. There are also uncertainties regarding the 
effectiveness of normative appeals, the noninstrumental value of procedurally just 
practices, and how taxpayers frame tax decisions for purposes of behavioral 
analyses. Application of the models of tax compliance to state use taxes would thus 
serve not only to increase use-tax compliance, but could provide incredibly valuable 
information regarding the validity and application of those methods in a real-world 
setting. This is of critical importance. Indeed, researchers recognize the limitations 
of laboratory experiments and the benefit of, and need for, field experiments to 
further our knowledge of the motivators of tax compliance.305  
                                                 
304 See Blank, supra note 4, at 752–55. 
305 Alm, supra note 24, at 75 (2012); Hallsworth et al., supra note 73, at 27; Luttmer & 
Singhal, supra note 62, at 166; Michael Pickhardt & Aloys Prinz, Behavioral Dynamics of 
Tax Evasion—A Survey, 40 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 1, 14 (2014); Benno Torgler, Speaking to 
Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and Tax Compliance in Experiments, 16 J. 
ECON. SURVS. 657, 661 (2002). 
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State use taxes present a very real opportunity for that type of research, and the 
benefits would extend far beyond states and their budgets. Application of the models 
of tax compliance would not only help states to close their use-tax gaps, but the 
lessons learned could help researchers to further understand the models of tax 
compliance more generally. Researchers and states should thus work together to run 
controlled experiments on these models of compliance specifically in the use-tax 
context. Through those joint efforts, researchers can learn more about those models 
and perhaps apply those lessons to the federal tax gap and tax gaps worldwide.  
Although it is beyond the scope of this piece to completely outline a research 
framework, it is important to more fully explain why the use-tax gap is a beneficial 
area to research. The relevance of this little-known state tax to federal income taxes 
may not be self-evident, especially to those who usually focus on national-level 
taxes.  
As an initial matter, experimentation in the use-tax area should be attractive 
because there is little risk of causing any loss.306 Given the lack of any meaningful 
use-tax compliance currently, state revenue authorities need not be significantly 
concerned that any particular attempt might “backfire” and cause a loss of revenue. 
The lack of current collections may also give states more flexibility in how to frame 
their efforts. As noted above, one potential experiment would be to allow taxpayers 
to make binding allocations of their tax payments. States wanting to experiment with 
that method for encouraging compliance may find that easier to do in the context of 
a tax where all of the revenue collected would be new. Thus, the fact that any use-
tax revenues would be a new category of revenue for a state may mean that states 
have more flexibility to experiment.  
The lack of current compliance and the lack of current compliance efforts may 
also make it easier to isolate the effects of any particular experiment. An experiment 
applying a particular treatment to taxpayers with respect to their use-tax liabilities 
taxes would produce results with fewer complicating factors than an experiment 
involving federal income-tax obligations. Research on federal income-tax 
compliance is complicated by more significant outside influences (e.g., general 
awareness and politicization of the income tax, general public discussion regarding 
the fairness of the federal tax system, election-related attention to tax compliance or 
tax reform, etc.). An otherwise ignored tax may reduce that noise. Of course, the 
lack of current collections could also be a negative for researchers. It would be more 
difficult to determine if a particular action would serve to reduce compliance, though 
it seems unlikely that a state would permit a field experiment with a meaningful risk 
of lost revenue in any event. 
Use-tax experimentation would also benefit from the fact that there are forty-
five different states that impose a use tax.307 The role of states as laboratories for 
                                                 
306 Cf. supra notes 43–54 and accompanying text (discussing a Minnesota study that 
decreased income-tax compliance among high-income taxpayers).  
307 Shelia O’Sullivan et al., State Government Tax Collections Summary Report: 2013, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 6 (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www2.census.gov/govs/statetax/2013stc 
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testing different legal and social structures is well engrained in the U.S. political and 
legal system.308 Tax-compliance researchers could use that political laboratory for 
use as an actual laboratory. To the extent that states have different characteristics or 
that experimental efforts can be coordinated, research on state use taxes provides an 
excellent laboratory to test the models of compliance. Differences in current use-tax 
compliance rates already offer an interesting avenue for such research. 
Experimentation would simply further leverage the benefit of our federal system.  
Within the laboratory of the states, use taxes also present a particularly 
beneficial type of tax with which to experiment. This goes beyond the mere lack of 
current compliance discussed above. Rather, use taxes have the benefit of being 
relatively isolated in their application and impact. This is in contrast to state income 
taxes, which both rely upon and have an impact on individuals’ federal income taxes.  
State income-tax calculations rely on a person’s federal income taxes because 
those calculations generally begin with a taxpayer’s federal taxable income.309 A 
number of adjustments are then made to that amount to take into account local 
desires and conditions. To prevent abuse, state revenue authorities and the federal 
government share taxpayer information. A taxpayer who feels compelled by some 
experimental method to report more income to her state is therefore effectively 
prevented from reporting that income only to her state. Any attempt to increase 
compliance with state income taxes therefore must not only be effective at the state 
level, but it also must overcome any taxpayer aversion to paying more federal 
income taxes. That factor may mitigate or overwhelm the positive impact of attempts 
at the state level. 
State income-tax calculations also impact a person’s federal income taxes 
because once a state tax liability is paid, taxpayers who itemize their deductions are 
allowed a deduction for those amounts against their adjusted gross income. 310 
Income-tax reporting positions thus implicate both state and federal interests. The 
two taxes are inextricably intertwined.  
State use taxes are not so entangled. A persons’ use-tax liability is generally not 
tied to their income-tax liability. With limited exceptions, use taxes are neither 
determined by reference to income-tax amounts nor do they impact those 
amounts.311 The isolated nature of the use tax thus removes another complicating 
factor in determining the impact of a compliance effort. 
                                                 
report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/P8UM-2BH2. 
308  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).  
309 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
310 26 U.S.C. § 164(a)(3) (2012).  
311 This is, of course, not true in states where taxpayers can report their use-tax liabilities 
by making reference to a table that makes use of their taxable income calculations, or for 
individuals who deduct their state sales and use taxes, rather than state income taxes, from 
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It is also interesting to note that the conditions impacting state use-tax 
compliance are similar to the conditions that will test tax compliance globally with 
respect to emerging areas like cryptocurrency transactions and the so-called sharing 
economy. IRS data show that compliance suffers dramatically when information 
reporting and withholding at the source are not available or are not required.312 
Generating compliance is even harder when the information required for a revenue 
authority to establish a liability is decentralized. Those conditions are equally 
present with respect to use taxes and income taxes on transactions in the new 
economy.  
Use taxes are difficult to enforce, in part, because states currently have little 
way of efficiently knowing consumers’ purchasing behavior and thus rely on 
taxpayer self-disclosure. Further, there is little centralization of information because 
consumers shop from a multitude of retailers. Cryptocurrency transactions and 
nonwage income sources are similar in that they may involve diffuse parties that 
likely hold only a sliver of the information needed by the taxing authority. Absent 
information reports, the revenue authority must rely on the goodwill of the taxpayer 
to collect revenue from those transactions. As more of the economy moves into these 
areas, compliance research will become more important. Research on use-tax 
compliance could help to provide valuable information on the motivators of 
compliance in these situations.  
 
B.  Weaknesses 
 
The preceding analysis is not meant to suggest that experimentation in the use-
tax arena would provide us with perfect results directly applicable to tax gaps of all 
types. To begin with, use taxes and federal income taxes bring with them much 
different baggage. To the extent that compliance with a tax depends on factors like 
the public’s perception of the utility of the tax or the legitimacy of the government 
imposing the tax, results from use-tax experimentation may fail to translate into the 
federal income-tax system. Additionally, moving compliance from near zero to 
something greater may involve much different factors than what is needed to 
improve compliance when most already voluntarily comply. Results from use-tax 
experimentation may therefore fail to provide any new information regarding how 
to close the federal income-tax gap. 
There is no use in ignoring these difficulties, but they should not prevent states 
and researchers from undertaking use-tax experimentation. If they can obtain use-
tax compliance due to factors that do not currently exist with respect to the federal 
income tax (perhaps taxpayers’ personal feelings of attachment to their local 
government, for example), then researchers and the federal government will have 
more information regarding ways in which to change the federal income tax or the 
                                                 
their federal income. See 26 U.S.C. § 164(b)(5) (2012) (allowing taxpayers the option of 
deducting their state and local sales taxes in lieu of their state and local income taxes).  
312 See supra note 38. 
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structure under which it is imposed. They could also better understand the 
impediments to tax compliance. If the factors that drive use-tax compliance are not 
replicable under the federal tax system, then researchers will know that they must 
be more creative in promoting compliance. Finally, even though use taxes may be 
different than income taxes as a qualitative matter, they should not function as worse 
proxies than lab experiments where exactions are simply labeled a “tax.” Existing 
laboratory research on tax compliance depends on artificial constructs that attempt 
to replicate real-world behavior by simply labeling expenditures as taxes or by 
asking people to make decisions about hypothetical scenarios.313 The results from 
those experiments can predict taxpayer behavior regardless of their lack of direct fit. 
Use-tax experimentation is unlikely to be a worse proxy than those laboratory 
experiments.  
It would also be short-sighted to reject use-tax experimentation simply because 
the current compliance norm is so different than for federal income taxes. Building 
compliance from a 0% rate to a 20% rate is certainly different than building 
compliance from an 80% rate to a 100% rate. The factors motivating those changes 
and the classes of taxpayers making those changes in behavior may be very different. 
The “early adopters” may do so simply because they become aware of the tax or 
because they are very risk averse. Informational returns or weak threats of audit may 
work on those individuals, but fail to cause greater compliance among those who 
have chosen to ignore their income-tax obligations. Again, however, this does not 
mean that use-tax experimentation would be fruitless.  
First, understanding how and why taxpayers comply when compliance is 
otherwise low may be helpful in understanding how to maintain a compliance norm. 
Second, compliance with income taxes is not high for all types of taxpayers and for 
all types of income. As noted above, compliance levels differ among populations 
                                                 
313 See Alm, supra note 24, at 66 (2012). Professor Alm describes laboratory research 
on tax compliance as follows: 
 
The basic design of most compliance experiments is similar. Human subjects in a 
controlled laboratory are told that they should feel free to make as much income 
as possible. At the beginning of each round of the experiment, each subject is 
given (or earns) income and must decide how much income to report. Taxes are 
paid at some rate on all reported, but not on underreported, income. However, 
underreporting is discovered with some probability, and an audited subject must 
then pay a fine on unpaid taxes. This process is repeated for a given number of 
rounds. At the completion of the experiment, each subject is paid an amount that 
depends on his or her performance during the experiment. Into this 
microeconomic system, various policy changes can be introduced, such as 
changes in audit probabilities or audit rules, in penalty rates, in tax rates, in public 
good provision, and in any other relevant institutions. 
 
Id. Of course, he also recognizes that “there are legitimate concerns about the ‘external 
validity’ of experimental studies of tax compliance.” Id. at 67.  
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and with respect to certain income sources. Creating some compliance from no 
compliance may thus be more applicable to those situations—precisely the situations 
that need significant improvement. Third, as noted above, building compliance with 
respect to use taxes may serve as a good proxy for building compliance with respect 
to taxes on income in the new economy or in countries without norms of compliance. 
Instead of attempting to divine which factors have created compliance norms in the 
past, research in the use-tax area could be used to look at building a compliance 
norm in “real time.” If states can create compliance norms with respect to use taxes 
using modern theories of tax compliance, the lessons from those actions would be 
of great utility.  
As a final matter, it may very well be that states and researchers are still 
unconvinced that these efforts are worthwhile because, at a base level, taxpayers 
simply have no meaningful economic incentive to pay use taxes and doing so would 
place them in the vast minority of taxpayers. Certainly, the limited experimentation 
that has been done to date has provided little reason to be optimistic about future 
efforts. Without any risk of detection and penalty, why would anyone comply?  
It would be foolish to ignore the great impediments to obtaining a meaningful 
level of voluntary compliance with state use taxes given the current economics for 
individual taxpayers and for states. However, if one truly believes that compliance 
depends on something more than deterrence theory, use-tax experimentation will be 
highly valuable. Given the lack of any real deterrence in this area, any compliance 
that can be generated absolutely must be attributable to the validity of those 
alternative models. Likewise, if no compliance can be obtained, researchers can 
acknowledge the primacy of the classic deterrence model—at least as a first step—
in obtaining a compliance norm.  
In the end, use-tax experimentation will not provide data and results that are 
perfectly applicable to the federal income-tax gap. However, that does not mean that 
experimentation is not warranted. The data would be valuable in many ways, both 
to tax researchers and administrators in the United States and to those abroad. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Tax-compliance issues continue to afflict governments worldwide. A number 
of models of tax compliance have developed to help explain taxpayer behavior, but 
significant questions persist. As this Article has explained, experimentation has 
produced conflicting results within particular models of compliance, and the 
interaction between the various predictive factors is uncertain and complex. Further 
research is thus needed, and this Article argues that research and attention would 
properly be directed to promoting individual compliance with state use taxes. 
Compliance with those taxes is virtually nonexistent, and states’ efforts to require 
vendors to collect those taxes have been unsuccessful. Further, even if states obtain 
authority to require vendors to collect those taxes, it appears as though less than one-
half of the use-tax gap would be closed. This presents a remarkable opportunity for 
states and researchers to apply the models of tax compliance. The benefits of testing 
those models in the use-tax context would inure to states in the form of increased 
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revenue and to researchers and governments worldwide in the form of additional 
information on how tax-compliance models work more generally. It is thus time to 
stop assuming that state use taxes are unenforceable and time to use the great 
opportunities presented by those taxes. 
